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I. INTRODUCTION

One conflict has plagued parents forever: While on the one hand they must teach
their children to become responsible and independent individuals, on the other hand,
they must also provide their children with structure, discipline and physical
protection. Thus, while children are utterly dependent on others in protecting their
most basic interests, they are also extraordinarily vulnerable to all manners of abuse
and neglect. It is the balancing of these two seemingly conflicting dynamics then
that perhaps makes parenting the most complex and challenging job on the planet.
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And this conundrum complicates the U.S. legal system in its dealings with the
family, as well. While parents clearly have a fundamental right to determine how to
best provide for their children,2 the state must also ensure that parents meet their
“high duty”3 to ensure their children’s well being. The critical question addressed in
this Article is how can the state efficiently and effectively act to ensure that children
are, in fact, being provided for in their homes—while avoiding intruding on the
rights of parents in the process?
Currently our courts and legislators attempt to resolve cases involving the parentchild relationship under either of two legal doctrines. One approach recognizes that
as children are so vulnerable and because childhood development is so critical,
sometimes the best interests of the child must be the primary focus of the law. Under
this doctrine, the law may both protect the most defenseless of individuals, as well as
protect the future health of society itself, at the same time.
Yet, anytime children are made the top priority in the legal analysis, or if any
affirmative rights are asserted on their behalf, there is a risk that the state may totally
override the basic rights and authority of parents in the home. Therefore, the second
approach to these cases is a doctrine of parental autonomy.4 This approach is
generally characterized by the state’s broad deference to the interests and authority
of parents (often under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment),5 and
by an avoidance of granting children any affirmative rights.6 This primacy of
parents’ rights under the law can generally be described as follows: “Parents have a
fundamental liberty interest, which gives them the right to establish a home, raise
2

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).

3

Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).

4

Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (referring to “parental
autonomy” as being where the state creates “a zone of private authority within which each
parent, whether custodial or noncustodial, remains free to impart to the child his or her
religious perspective.”); Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In this case,
the exceptions covering a broad variety of circumstances do give parents greater flexibility to
allow their children to stay out after hours and in that way minimize the interference with
parental autonomy.”); Doe v. School Dist. of the City of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 2003)
(holding that parents’ asserted right to protect child from prayer at public school graduation
ceremony treated as a substantive due process right to “parental autonomy”); and Hutchins v.
District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (acknowledging the heightened
constitutional protection of parents in setting curfews for their children as part of a right to
“parental autonomy.”).
5

See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-535
“The liberty of parents and guardians” includes the right “to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.” Id.; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753 (1982) (discussing “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody and management of their children”); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658 (holding that an unwed
father’s unfitness as a parent cannot be presumed, and due process demands a hearing).
6

See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745 (1984); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Further illustrative is that of the 189 members of the United
Nations, only the U.S. and Somalia continue to refuse to ratify the Convention on the Rights
of the Child granting children a basic level of affirmative individual rights. Somini Sengupta,
U.N. Session Begins to Tally The Perils of Being Young, NEW YORK TIMES, May 9, 2002, A14.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005

3

288

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:285

children, and control their education and upbringing. As long as parents are ‘fit,’ the
state has no reason to interfere with the exercise of this interest.”7 While these two
doctrines do work well in most cases, in too many others, however, they fall short
altogether.
The problem is that the law has never been able to adequately reconcile these
approaches with one another. In fact, and amazingly enough, our courts have yet to
even define the “exact metes and bounds” of the individual liberty interests of
parents, or children.8 Thus, in the more complex of these cases, often there are no
clear nor consistent tests for determining when exactly the law should rely on one
doctrine or the other; for adequately balancing the interests of parent and child; nor
for recognizing the most obvious of exceptions to the above doctrines.
Currently, this vital area of the law is unsettled, ambiguous and arbitrary. To
give a few examples, while children currently do not enjoy constitutional recourse as
to food, shelter, or even freedom from assault, they do enjoy constitutional recourse
as to free speech, emergency medical care and a right to abortion.9 And while the
states’ often shocking failures to protect even the most basic interests of children is
(or should be) a national embarrassment,10 in other situations, critics note an overlyintrusive “child abuse industry,” where the constitutional rights of parents can be
infringed on by the state in a relatively arbitrary manner.11 Simply put, this most
critical area of the law is ripe for re-evaluation.
In cases involving the parent-child relationship, the law must contend with
numerous moral, factual, and legal issues as challenging as any our courts face. As a
few illustrations, parents who appear to be neglecting a child may be criminally
neglectful, or may be mentally ill, or may simply be very poor.12 Inappropriate
parental practices to one person may make perfect sense in a different cultural or
religious community. A child with mysterious bruises may be a victim of abuse, or
may just be an extremely active child.13 And a runaway youth may be characterized
as a juvenile delinquent, but may only be escaping a home life that actually makes

7
Joanna Grossman, Can the Fifty States’ Grandparent Visitation Statutes Survive in the
Wake of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Troxel v. Granville?, available at
http://writ.findlaw.com/grossman/20020312.html (visited February 10, 2005).
8
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 78 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (“It is true that in our
cases we have never set out the exact metes and bounds to the protected interest of a parent in
the relationship with his child.”); Michael D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989)
(reserving question of setting the bounds of the interests of children in the parent-child
relationship).
9

Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children’s Perspectives and
the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 29 (1994).
10

See, e.g., supra note 5.

11

MARY PRIDE, THE CHILD ABUSE INDUSTRY (1989); CHRISTOPHER J. KLICKA, THE RIGHT
CHOICE, 268 (1993).
12
Michael Compitello, Parental Rights and Family Integrity: Forgotten Victims in the
Battle Against Child Abuse, 18 PACE L. REV. 135, 147-48 (1997) (discussing “lingering colds”
and “thin child” accusations).
13

See, e.g., id. (discussing misuse of child abuse hotlines and related issues).
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life on the streets a reasonable alternative.14 Thus, the use of bright-line legal tests in
these cases can be highly impractical, at best.
What the doctrines of parental autonomy and the best interest of the child attempt
to do is to simplify these immense ambiguities in the most rational ways possible. In
their current forms, however, these approaches are overly broad and overly rigid.
Instead of resolving ambiguities, the toughest questions are simply ignored. The
doctrine of parental autonomy is defined so broadly that in some cases the interests
of children are actually eclipsed from the legal analysis—and vise versa under the
best interests of the child standard.
These approached rarely unravel the interests of parent and child so as to allow
for a very clear analysis. In this way, sometimes what are known to be incredibly
abusive parents, for example, inexplicably enjoy the strongest of constitutional
protections, while state actors may effectively and arbitrarily assert their own,
personal views of parenting into the home, in place of a parents’. In other words,
parents and children are alternately excluded from any given case—that is, their
interests ‘disappear,’ altogether.
Part One of this Article further examines those moral, factual and legal dynamics
in the family that make these cases so difficult. Part Two summarizes the present
state of the law, and demonstrates precisely where and why the current legal
approach is falling short. I will show how the law specifically fails to adequately
define the rights of parents, substantively as well as procedurally and, I will
furthermore demonstrate how, in their current forms, the doctrines of parental
autonomy and the best interests of the child are far too broad and too rigid for many
cases involving the parent-child relationship.15
Finally, Part Three advances an original and more just constitutional analysis for
examining the parent-child relationship. In short, under this approach the best
aspects of both the doctrines of parental autonomy and the best interests of the child
are incorporated into one, more comprehensive and more cohesive, analysis.
This approach will provide two main improvements over the current legal
analysis. First, the constitutional rights of parents in governing their families will be
greatly clarified and strengthened. Second, under this analysis the individual
interests of both parent and child will at the least be acknowledged in every case,
thus the interests of neither will ever actually be allowed to “disappear” from the
analysis. As the sole purpose of this approach will be to better advance the interests
of the family as a whole, it will be termed the Single Objective Analysis.

14

See, e.g., Homeless Youth: The Saga of “Pushouts” and “Throwaways” in America.
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980); U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICA’S MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN: THEIR SAFETY AND THEIR
FUTURE (1986).
15

The best interests of the child doctrine has been widely criticized for its ambiguity. See
A.L.I. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 2, note 2 (Tentative Draft No. 3, Mar. 20,
1998); Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 60; Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98
YALE L.J. 293 (1988); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the best interests of the child,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism Parental Preference, and Child
Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615 (1992).
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PART ONE: THE CHALLENGE OF THE LAW AND THE FAMILY
II. THREE HURDLES
As evidenced in the above factual scenarios, the law and the family can be a most
awkward mix. The problem is three-fold. First, these cases often touch on the most
deeply held personal beliefs of individuals, such as matters regarding morality or
religion, for example. Thus, many of these cases touch on issues that society may
not want decided in a court of law.
Second, often these cases are factually ambiguous. Many key events may occur
behind closed doors, such as in many cases of physical or sexual abuse, for example,
while other cases may hinge on highly ambiguous determinations, such as
psychological factors, or on a determination as to a parent’s state of mind. Thus,
these are often not issues that are easily quantified for the purposes of litigation,
either.16
Finally, it is sometimes difficult to determine precisely where it is that a parent’s
most personal and most critical rights of authority and to privacy in the home ends
and where the state’s duty to protect children must begin. This balancing act is
perhaps the most challenging aspect of these cases.
Due to the above factors, cases involving the parent-child relationship are
particularly susceptible to inappropriate individual biases and procedural errors.
Arbitrary factors, such as the socio-economic status of a family, or the individual
cultural, moral or religious beliefs of any one particular parent, social worker or
judge, all may alter the outcomes of cases.17 Yet, even when such mistakes may
seem relatively minor, they can have a devastating impact on the lives of those
involved. While the margin of error may be small in these cases, the stakes can be
enormous.
III. THE CURRENT SOLUTION
As parental rights are as highly valued as any rights afforded under the
Constitution,18 most issues involving the parent-child relationship are governed by
the doctrine of parental autonomy. Generally speaking, in any case where important
rights of parents are deemed to be at risk, various broad and rigid legal rules and
procedural safeguards will be cited to favor the parent. In this way, the critical
interests of parents are largely protected from individual judges, social workers, or
other state actors, who might otherwise resolve these ambiguous issues against

16
See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762-763 (pointing out the inherent ambiguity of family
law cases, such as due to latitude given to individual judges). The Court raised a concern as to
racial and socio-economic factors entering the analysis, which most certainly lead to a
disparity in how family rights are respected. Id. at 762 n.12.
17
See id. at 762 (noting that determinations as to a parent’s fitness are “unusually open to
the subjective values of the judge”).
18

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western
civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”).
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parents in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.19 Because the parent’s interest in
the home is understood to be so crucial, it is said that any risk of legal error or bias
must instead be absorbed either by the children, or by the state.
As an example, in visitation cases, there is a strong presumption that visits with a
legally “fit,” biological parent will in fact be in the “best interests” of the child.20
Absent fairly extreme, extenuating circumstances,21 the practical effect of this
assumption is to render most factual ambiguities and potential procedural problems
moot. This is true because regardless of whether such difficulties are present in a
case or not, the law is going to safely err on the side of protecting the parental
interest. Instead, it is the child’s interest that effectively absorbs any errors and the
basic structure of the family is maintained.
An ideal illustration is the 2000 Supreme Court visitation case of Troxel v.
Granville,22 often referred to as the grandparents’ rights case. In Troxel, a pair of
grandparents had petitioned for increased visitation rights with their grandchildren,
but the children’s mother had then opposed that petition. (The children’s father, the
grandparent’s son, was deceased).23 The grandparents’ claim was supported, in part,
by the fact that the grandchildren had stayed with their father when he had lived in
the grandparents’ home. The grandparents thus argued that this contact was
evidence of the important relationship they had with the children and, therefore, that
increased visits would be in the children’s “best interests.”24
In granting the grandparents’ petition, the trial court had not explicitly25 relied on
any hard evidence to override the mother’s preference, but instead relied on an
assumption that children “normally” benefit from visits with their grandparents.26
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, then held that it is a general deference to the
wishes of parents that determines these cases.27 Clearly, it is a mother’s preference
as to who may visit her children, and how often, that is presumed to be in the
children’s best interests, and the law must err against such requests by third parties

19

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 765 (in a case concerning the termination of parents’ rights, the
Supreme Court overruled the State Court that had “suggested that a preponderance standard
properly allocates the risk of error between the parents and the child. That view is
fundamentally mistaken”).
20

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.

21

“Even a fit parent is capable of treating a child as a mere possession.” Id. at 86.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
22

See supra note 8.

23

530 U.S. at 60.

24

Id. at 71.

25

Justice Stevens did raise the question as to whether certain factors had indeed been
granted weight and were perhaps implicit in the lower court ruling. 530 U.S. 82 fn 3.
26

Id. at 69.

27

“It is not within the province of the state to make significant decisions concerning the
custody of children merely because it could make a ‘better decision.’” Id. at 63 (quoting In Re
Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 31 (Wash. 1998).
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when opposed by a parent.28 This presumption thus encapsulates the doctrine of
parental autonomy.
Conversely, in a case were it is the critical interests of a child that are most at
risk, the doctrine of the best interests of the child is cited to similarly favor the child.
Here, the law broadly errs on the side of allowing state intrusions into the family in
order to prevent obvious and unnecessary harms to a child. Consider the following
illustration: If there is strong evidence of imminent danger from abuse or neglect in a
home, social workers and police officers are granted relatively broad latitude under
Fourth Amendment search and seizure requirements in order to temporarily remove
children from such environments.29 If, after an adequate investigation, it is shown
that no such danger exists, the child is returned to his or her home. While such an
action can be a tremendous disruption to a family, this potential harm is outweighed
by the state’s inability to otherwise save a vast number of children from
unnecessarily enduring what may be devastating psychological and physical
damage,30 and even fatalities.31
The rationale driving both of these doctrines is that while there is always a risk in
relying on such broad legal rules and assumptions, this is unavoidable given the
complex nature of the parent-child relationship. While the law cannot guarantee
perfect outcomes for all cases, the current doctrines do ensure that in even the most
complex or ambiguous of circumstances, the most vital interests will be strongly
protected. Therefore, it can safely be said that these doctrines do provide the most
just results, in the vast majority of cases.
However, as currently conceived, these doctrines also rely on rules and
assumptions that are so sweeping, and so formalistic, that ultimately they can rely
on some rather dubious logic—and even result in opinions that ignore the very facts
presented! As will be further demonstrated in Part Two of this Article, sometimes
these doctrines are even incapable of dealing with the most relevant of issues.32 A
28
Id. at 68-69 (“there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.”).
29

See KLICKA, supra note 11 at 264.

30

See infra section IX, D.

31

A report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggested that 5.4 of every
100,000 children under four-years-old in America die from abuse or neglect. Administration
For Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, A Nation’s
Shame: Fatal Child Abuse and Neglect on the U.S., a report of the U.S. Administrative Board
on Child Abuse and Neglect, xxi (1995).
32
Symbolic of this dilemma is that in some cases even the most basic interests of children
have been neglected to the point where in one particular case an abused child was “never seen
outside the home until autopsy.” A NATION’S SHAME, at xv. In other high-profile cases,
children supposedly under the care of the state have been horribly neglected, even to the point
of starvation. See, e.g., New Jersey: Trenton: State May Settle Starvation Lawsuit, The NEW
YORK TIMES, B-5, September 2, 2004. Yet, he over-involvement of the state into the affairs of
families has created what one commentator has described as a “child abuse industry.”
Michael Compitello, Parental Rights and Family Integrity: Forgotten Victims in the Battle
Against Child Abuse, 18 PACE L. REV. 135, at (1997), quoting CHRISTOPHER J. KLICKA, THE
RIGHT CHOICE 252, 268 (1993); see also MARY PRIDE, THE CHILD ABUSE INDUSTRY (1989).
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telling example again occurs in visitation matters. While in every State it is the “best
interests of the child” that specifically governs the analysis, the current reality is that
“[e]ven parents that fail to support their children and physically abusive parents . . .
retain their constitutional visitation rights, enforceable against the child’s will and
regardless of the child’s ‘best interests.’”33 And, as another example, protections of
parents from state searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment may
effectively be defined by overzealous—and almost always understaffed—social
workers with little “fluency” in actually defining such legal standards.34 In short,
under the current approach, all logic may be lost.
PART TWO: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF PARENTAL AUTONOMY
The legal analysis of the family in America begins with the interests and
authority of parents. What is clear throughout this area of the law is that the state
will consistently err on the side of protecting some very strong parental interests in
the home.35 Thus, while this general doctrine is not always specifically referred to as
the doctrine of “parental autonomy,”36 this term accurately and conveniently
encapsulates a large body of law.
A. The Foundation of Parental Autonomy: Meyer and Pierce
The foundation for parental autonomy was established in the two seminal
parental rights cases of the 1920’s: Meyer v. Nebraska37 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters.38 Meyer and Pierce were the first U.S. Supreme Court decisions to recognize
the individual liberty interests of parents as fundamental rights, protected under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.39
33
Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children’s Perspectives
and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, at 60 (1994) (emphasis in original) In fact, “the best
interests of any particular child always yield to the constitutional interests of their parents,” in
almost every area of the law. Id. See also, Fitzgerald at76-77, discussing DeBoer v. Schmidt,
114 S. Ct. 1 (1993)(adoption context).
34

Frantz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 831 (10th Cir. 1993).

35

See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”); Yoder,
406 U.S. at 232 (“This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”).
36

See, e.g., supra note 4.

37

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

38

268 U.S. 571 (1925).

39

Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (Court held that an unwed father’s unfitness as a parent cannot
be presumed and due process demands a hearing); see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; Pierce,
268 U.S. at 574-575 (noting that “the liberty of parents and guardians” includes the right “to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”); Santosky, 455 U.S. at
753 (discussing “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody and
management of their children”).
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At issue in Meyer was a Nebraska law banning the teaching of foreign languages
to grade school students. The intention of the law had been to promote the use of the
English language in America at a time of enormous post-World War One, European
immigration.
Challenging the law was a teacher, Meyer, who had been instructing immigrant
schoolchildren using Bibles written in their native-languages.40 Meyer argued that
for many religious families such Bible instruction was critical to lessons of morality
and discipline concurrently being taught in the home. If an ability to read the Bible
were not at least then facilitated in the schools, it would logically follow that those
children would have great difficulty in developing those religious/moral lessons in
their lives. It was thus argued that the state law restricted a basic ability of parents
into governing their homes—an interest said to be of far greater import than was the
promotion of the English language.41
A unanimous Supreme Court agreed with Meyer and struck down the statute.
The Court held that the ban on foreign languages violated a fundamental right of
parents to “establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience and generally to enjoy . . . the orderly pursuit of
happiness.”42
Two years later, in Pierce, the Court invalidated an Oregon law requiring
children to attend public schools, as opposed to religious or other private schools.
The purpose of the compulsory state school system had mirrored the purpose in
Meyer to “promote civic development” and patriotism in all school children in a
post-World War One America.43 Yet, this law too, was held to be an impermissible
state intrusion into a private (and what was largely seen as a religiously-motivated)
family decision.44
In Pierce, the Court articulated the rights of parents as follows: “The child is not
a mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.”45 Thus, the right to determine whether religious, private or public
schools were best for children was said to fall under a broad, fundamental right of
parents to “direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”46
In the years since Meyer and Pierce, these fundamental parental rights have been
further entrenched under various circumstances, from determining visitation rights,

40

Establishment Clause challenges in the schools would come later. See School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that the government may not
affirmatively oppose or show hostility toward religion in public schools).
41

262 U.S. at 394.

42

Id. at 399.

43

Id. at 401.

44

Id. at 535.

45

Id. at 535.

46

Id. at 534-35.
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to home-schooling cases, to the denying of certain medical care for children in nonlife threatening situations, as examples.47
B. The Basic Parameters of Parental Rights
Simply put, the doctrine of parental autonomy forces the state to take a “handsoff” approach to the American family,48 thereby allowing parents to raise their
children as they see fit. Under the First Amendment, parents enjoy fundamental
rights of speech, belief, and religion in the home, as well as rights of privacy, under
either the Fourth or the Fifth Amendments. Thus parents are protected from
intrusions by the state into their homes. These interests are protected as fundamental
rights under the Constitution.
Parents also enjoy fundamental, individual “liberty” interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,49 which are generally defined as
rights to the “care, custody, and control” of ones children.50 These are, in fact, the
rights most often in dispute in our courts.
All fundamental rights are then protected from state intervention under the
Supreme Court’s most stringent legal analysis: of strict scrutiny. The only
“significant”51 state infringements allowed upon a parent’s fundamental rights under
this test are those “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,” and where
a “less restrictive” means is not available.52
The strict scrutiny test is so difficult to overcome, in fact, that the practical reality
is that once the specific actions or preferences of a parent are deemed to be
47

See, e.g., Baruch Gitlin, Parents’ Criminal Liability for Failure to Provide Medical
Attention to their Children, 118 A.L.R.5th 253 (2005) (“It is generally recognized that parents
have a duty to provide medical attention to their children.”); see also State v. Jones, 778 So.
2d 1131 (La. 2001) (convicting a father of manslaughter where the mother had actually struck
the fatal blows to child, but the father did not get medical attention); Priego v. State, 658
S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (stating in dicta that parents have duty to provide medical
attention to their children).
48

Also, as local legislatures and local courts are often better acquainted with the
communities involved, the individual parties, and the factual records of each of these
individual cases, more specific details and issues may be better left to local courts and
lawmakers to deal with on a case-by-case basis. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 101 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). “We must keep in mind that family courts in the 50 States confront these factual
variances each day, and are best situated to consider the unpredictable, yet inevitable, issues
that arise.” Id.; see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703-704; Troxel, 530 U.S. at
93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I have no reason to believe that federal judges will be better at this
than state legislatures; and state legislatures have the great advantage of doing more harm in a
circumscribed area, of being able to correct their mistakes in a flash, and of being removable
by the people.”); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is indisputably the
business of the States, rather than a federal court employing a national standard, to assess in
the first instance the relative importance of the conflicting interests that give rise to disputes
such as this.”).
49

See Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.

50

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).

51

Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Ct., 25 Cal. 3d 33, 47 (1979).

52

See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
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fundamental in a case, that parental interest effectively becomes almost immune from
any and all state intrusions.53 For example, a parent has a First Amendment right to
indoctrinate his or her children with his or her religion of choice, and the U.S.
government clearly has no discernible interest in otherwise imposing its own
religious beliefs, or lack thereof, upon a family. Therefore, strict scrutiny will
protect this parental choice almost no matter what circumstances may be present in
any given case.
At the same time, any state intrusions that do not “significantly curtail” a parent’s
fundamental rights, or any intrusions that infringe on what are lesser, nonfundamental rights in the home, are not analyzed under strict scrutiny.54 Parental
choices in the family will still be immune from unlawful state intrusions, but they are
protected under a lesser judicial standard called the rational basis test. Under this
standard, state intrusions are allowed so long as they are “rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose.”55 And once this test is cited in a case, government
intervention is rarely denied.56
Therefore, a parent does not have an “absolute” right to keep the state out of his
or her affairs.57 Simply put, certain parental actions clearly exceed the scope of any
legitimate rights to the actual “custody, control and care” of children, such as if there
is strong evidence of abuse in a home, for example. Furthermore, intrusions under
the more extreme of circumstances probably cannot be said to be a “significant”
intrusion on one’s legitimate ability to raise a family, either.
Unfortunately, while the above rules do simplify this analysis, they do not
provide an adequate legal framework for analyzing the parent-child relationship.
While parental autonomy is critical, determining the actual scope of this doctrine has
proven difficult, to say the least. Presently there is no clear idea as to what the
precise scope of a parent’s rights to the “custody, control and care” of a child really
are. Furthermore, nor is there any clear test for determining which state intrusions
on parental rights are actually “significant,” and which are not. In practice, all of the
above terms vary widely in meaning from case-to-case.
The realm of visitation rights again provides a prime illustration. If a biological
parent opposes a third parties’ requests for visits with a child, our State Courts will
cite to the basic and very broad parental rights of “custody” or “control” of one’s
child. In this way our courts attempt to further strengthen the critical authority of
53

See, e.g., infra notes 60 and 74.

54

See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (upholding the “rationality” of the
“Government’s separate interest in distributing benefits among competing needy families in a
fair way.”); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992) (“the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the
health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”). Id.
55

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).

56

See, e.g., DAVID KAIRYS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME 33-34 (1993) (“Courts
will defer, examining the validity of government actions only superficially to determine
whether there is any rational basis or rational relationship to some legitimate government
interest. If there is – and there almost always is – the government’s action is valid.
Invalidation of government action based on rational-basis judicial review has been extremely
rare.”).
57

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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parents in the home by presuming that the parent’s preferences are, in fact, in the
child’s best interests. This is of course logical and leads to sound outcomes in the
vast majority of cases. But currently such key terms are so ill-defined that often they
only serve to gloss over the most relevant of factual inquiries. Thus, certain
assumptions will preclude an adequate legal analysis.
In fact, in visitation cases a parent’s actual track record with his or her child is
regularly ignored. Instead, our courts assume that because the “natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of that child,” parents are likely to
act appropriately in the future.58 Yet, often this is an irrational and totally
unnecessary assumption.59 At least one state court has specifically noted the failings
of this approach:
Finding that the continuation of a poor, strained or nonexistent parentchild relationship will be detrimental to a child’s future welfare is
difficult. No one can divine with any assurance the future course of
human events. Nevertheless, past actions and relationships over a
meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be
expected to hold.60
These assumptions can not only be illogical, but dangerous, as well. Often, a
court will be better served to more thoroughly examine all of the facts actually
before it assumes anything. The parent-child relationship is simply too deep and too
complex for such superficial solutions.
Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court has noted the shortcomings of such
broad and rigid presumptions in protecting parental interests: “[Such presumptions
can] foreclose the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly
disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running
roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot
stand.”61 Yet, such assumptions are common.
In short, while “[p]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination,”62 a court can and must rationally examine all of the
evidence before making a final decision—as best it can. I would suggest that the real
problem in this area of the law is simply that often the law is too quick to cut off this
analysis. And this avoidance of difficult legal and factual determinations naturally
leads to unnecessary and illogical outcomes in all areas of the parent-child
relationship.
58

Id. at 68 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 548, 602 (1979)).

59

This is an extremely severe, relatively rare, and time-consuming determination in every
state. See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745; see also ORE. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.504 (“[T]he parent
or parents are unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child and
integration of the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable within a
reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change.”). Further, the reality in
many cases is that “even a ‘fit’ parent is capable of treating a child like a mere possession,” or
worse. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60

Linkous v. Kingery, 390 S.E.2d 188 (Va. 1990).

61

Id. (invalidating a presumption against granting visitation rights to unwed parents).

62

Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657.
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I would further suggest that if a parent has consistently shown his or herself to be
a very poor or even abusive parent in past visits with a child, then the relevant
question is not whether a parent is or is not entitled to rights of “custody,” “control,”
or “care” of his or her children. Such general, fundamental parental rights are
beyond dispute. Instead, the primary focus in these cases should be to determine at
precisely what point does a parent’s actions clearly exceed the legitimate scope of
“custody,” “control,” or “care” and, if so, when might state infringement in such a
case clearly be “significant,” or not? These are the types of questions that may not
even be asked in these cases currently—but will in fact be the focus of Part Three of
this Article.
Finally, even in those cases where the parental rights may be fairly clear, the
critical decision as to whether to protect parents’ rights under either the strict
scrutiny or the rational basis tests, too, is a relatively arbitrary process. No less than
Supreme Court Justice Scalia has opined that generally these tests “are no more
scientific than their names suggest, and a element of randomness is added by the fact
that it is largely up to us which test will be applied in each case.”63 And the practical
reality for the parent-child relationship then is that once parental autonomy is cited
to govern a court’s analysis and what are the currently ill-defined parental rights of
“custody, control and care,” the outcome of a case is predetermined in favor of the
parent—sometimes no matter what the evidence might otherwise indicate.64
In summary, currently our courts have relatively few clear or consistent
guidelines for adequately dealing with the parent-child relationship. While the
concepts of “custody,” “control,” and “care,” as well as the tests of strict scrutiny and
rational basis tests themselves, all sound reasonable enough and are all cited
regularly—each of these terms is relatively ambiguous and amorphous.
The challenge for the parent-child relationship then is to achieve the following:
(1) a consistent and just legal framework that is applicable to a wide array of
problems and circumstances; (2) respect for the critical authority of parents in the
home; and (3) ensuring that the basic interests of children. As Supreme Court Justice
Kennedy stated: “The principle [of broad deference to the rights of parents] exists,
then, in broad formulation; yet courts must use considerable restraint, including
careful adherence to the incremental instruction given by the precise facts of
particular cases, as they seek to give further and more precise definition to this
right.”65
Yet, “‘[o]ur nation’s history, legacy, traditions, and practices’ do not give us clear
or definitive answers”66 nor have they even “set out the exact metes and bounds to
the protected interest of a parent in the relationship with his child.”67

63

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).

64

This has long been a criticism of these tests. For example, under the strict scrutiny
analysis, only one case concerning racial bias has ever upheld state intrusion, the highly
controversial, Japanese-American internment case from World-War II. See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
65

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

66

Id. at 96 (quoting Glucksberg, 321 U.S. at 721).

67

See supra note 5.
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C. Troxel v. Granville
While not all of the issues raised in the above mentioned Troxel case are relevant
to this Article, the Justices did indeed identify the most crucial, unsettled issues of
the parent-child relationship. A more detailed analysis of Troxel follows in Part
Three of this Article.
While parental autonomy controlled the Troxel analysis, the four Justice
plurality, as well as two dissenting Justices, all were wary of applying any overly
broad conception of that doctrine. In fact, those six Justices chose not to protect the
parental preference with strict scrutiny under the facts in Troxel.68 Instead, the Court
specifically looked to a conception of parental autonomy that would indeed be
strong, but that would ensure that the interests of children would not be completely
eclipsed from the analysis either.69 The problem is that strict scrutiny is ill-suited for
resolving matters when there are multiple individuals whose rights will be impacted
by a decision.70
For example, in his dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that sometimes in visitation
cases the petitioning third party is the person who has effectively raised the child
(often a relative or foster parent) while the objecting biological parent has perhaps
been absent from the child’s life almost entirely.71 In short, often times granting a
third party visitation rights means preserving the only positive relationship a child
has ever known. Such a decision would then certainly seem to be the most just and
the most in line with a child’s actual “best interests.”
Sometimes, however, the current approach to parental autonomy is incapable of
accounting for even the most obvious of legal distinctions and factual variances.
While in Troxel this flaw was not necessarily alarming—as the third party claim was
not particularly strong72—this flawed logic is all too apparent in essentially every
area of the parent-child relationship.

68
See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The opinions of the plurality,
Justice KENNEDY and Justice SOUTER recognize such a [fundamental parental] right, but
curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict
scrutiny . . .”). The plurality instead required that “some special weight” be given to the
preference of a “fit” parent. Id. at 70.
69

The plurality explicitly agreed with Justice Kennedy on this point in that the
constitutionality of any given standard will vary, depending on how it is applied and that the
constitutional protections in this area are best “elaborated with care.” Id. at 73 (citations
omitted).
70

In the words of constitutional expert Professor David Meyers of the University of Illinois
School of Law, “[I]mplicitly the answer is it just doesn’t work here,” Susan Dominus, The
Father’s Crusade, The New York Times Magazine, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/08/
magazine/08FATHER.html=6tonef=login.
71

Id. at 85 (“there are plainly any number of cases—indeed, one suspects, the most
common to arise—in which the ‘person’ among ‘any’ seeking visitation is a once-custodial
caregiver . . .”). “Because grandparents and other relatives undertake duties of a parental
nature in many households, States have sought to ensure the welfare of children by protecting
the relationships those children form with such third parties.” Id. at 64.
72

Id. at 72 (noting the Trial Court’s “slender findings” in support of the grandparents’
claim).
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While the mandate in America for strong protections of parental rights is clear, it
is equally clear that the rights of parent’s are not absolute. Simply put, if the barriers
protecting the rights of parents from state intrusions are placed too high and are
made to be completely rigid, then even minimal interests of children do, in fact,
“disappear” from the legal analysis.
But this need not be the case. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires
the state to blindly protect any and all parental actions—particularly if such actions
are utterly irrational, or cause the wellbeing of a child to be made irrelevant. As
Justice Stevens further noted in Troxel: “The constitutional protection against
arbitrary exercise of state interference with parental rights should not be extended to
prevent the States from protecting children against arbitrary exercise of parental
authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child.”73
Too often, though, broad strokes have indeed rendered irrelevant some of the
most critical of distinctions in these cases.
V. PROBLEMS IN DEFINING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS
The problems plaguing the doctrine of parental autonomy are manifested in two,
very specific ways. First, often under the doctrine of parental autonomy, a parent’s
substantive rights are not defined with any real clarity. When these rights are
amorphous, they are naturally more likely to either eclipse, or be eclipsed by, the
interests of children.
Second, currently the law is also failing to adequately differentiate a parent’s
substantive rights from a parent’s procedural rights. These are indeed very distinct
rights to be treated very differently under the Constitution. Confusing these two
analyses also guarantees injustices.
A. Identifying the Substantive Rights of Parents
1. Factual Ambiguities and the Family
Many cases involving the parent-child relationship hinge on highly ambiguous
factual determinations. Thus in these cases there is a particular high risk that a court
may misread a vague factual record and erroneously decide a case against a parent’s
wishes.74 Yet, not only are parental rights fundamental, but they also have
specifically been deemed to outweigh the “lesser” interests of children in the home.75
Therefore, the doctrine of parental autonomy serves to ensure that whenever there is
factual ambiguity in a case, the law should err on the side of protecting the
substantive interests of the parent, even if this comes at the expense of a child’s
lesser interests.76

73

Id. at 89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

74

See, e.g., supra note 4 and 455 U.S. at 762 (noting that [n]umerous factors combine to
magnify the risk of erroneous fact-finding in the context of fermenting parental rights).
75
Id. at 765. The court held that a “balanced” view of parents’ and children’s interests
wrongly assumes that “society is nearly neutral between erroneous termination of parental
rights and erroneous failure to terminate those rights.” Id.
76

Id.
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For example, in the context of termination cases, where a parent has allegedly
been severely abusive or neglectful and faces having his or her children taken away
permanently, parental autonomy provides exceptionally strong safeguards. In these
cases, parents enjoy an increased evidentiary standard of clear and convincing
evidence, as opposed to the usual standard for civil cases of a preponderance of the
evidence, amongst many other protections.77
And in the visitation example once again, there is an automatic and very strong
presumption that what a parent wants for a child is, in fact, in the child’s “best
interests.” The state cannot interfere “any time it thinks it can do better” than a
parent, but it instead must respect a parent’s preferences.78 Therefore, to ensure the
integrity of parental rights and authority in even the most factually difficult and
ambiguous of cases, sometimes our courts must simply assume that a parent’s
actions or preferences are legitimate, rational, and deserving of the highest of
constitutional protections.
The fatal flaw of this approach, though, is that currently these assumptions are
made before the facts have been examined. There is no question that those actions of
parents that generally serve to educate children, or that teach children basic lessons
in morality or discipline, or in physically protecting children, are always critical and
fundamental, substantive rights. Indeed, such actions are usually rational, and are
usually made with a child’s best interests in mind. Yet, by automatically making
such assumptions, this approach ignores many cases where it is entirely
unambiguous that a parent’s actions are patently irrational, abusive, or worse.79
Under the current logic there can be no room for any thorough and rational analysis
of the facts; thus, any distinctions as to the varying degrees of a parent’s interests and
the enormous array of factual distinctions involved in these cases are ignored
entirely. A better understanding of this problem begins with revisiting the Meyer
and Pierce cases.
2. Revisiting Meyer and Pierce
The sole concern of the Supreme Court in both Meyer and Pierce had been—for
the first time in U.S. history—to affirmatively establish the constitutional rights of
parents in the home. Due to its focus on this rather historic objective, in neither
opinion did the Court bother to address how defining parental rights too broadly
could ever actually cause the interests of children to be eclipsed altogether.
Therefore, the Court used some extraordinarily broad and rigid language in
establishing those parental rights in as strong of terms as possible.
For example, the Court’s sole concern in Meyer was that allowing state intrusions
in that case would literally lead to the end of the family. The Court specifically cited
the teachings of Plato whom, in one of his less popular theories, had proposed that
children not even have individual parents, but instead that they should be made

77

Id. at 777-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (documenting lengthy hurdles, including
adequate and timely notice at all stages of not only termination process, but the initial
temporary removal of the children, evidentiary safeguards, multiple hearings, supplying of
attorneys to indigent parents, etc.).
78

530 U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

79

For a sampling of such injustices, see supra note 35.
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“common property” of the state.80 Thus, solely in an effort to ensure that children
were kept entirely out of the reach of the state and this potential nightmare, the Court
established the broad and effectively unlimited right of parents “to establish a home
and bring up children.”
And the more direct effect of such rules on children was not addressed in Pierce
either. In fact, in Pierce it had been argued that parents should be living their lives
“through [their children]” to attain “[a]ll that we missed, lost, failed of”. Yet, by that
logic, there would be no need to ever acknowledge how a court’s decision actually
affected a child. Children would literally be made irrelevant. Thus, parents were
again granted what was a broad and effectively unlimited right to direct the
“upbringing” and “education” of children “under their control.”81
Of course, the substantive parental rights recognized in Meyer and Pierce could
easily have been defined in more concise terms considering the facts of each case. In
Meyer, the parental right was simply a right to determine if one’s younger children
may be taught foreign languages in their public schools. And in Pierce, the right at
stake was simply the right to choose private schools for one’s children. Thus, in both
cases the parental rights could have been just as easily defined more specifically—
probably as fundamental, First Amendment freedoms of “speech,” “belief,” or
“religion”—instead of as broad and amorphous parental rights of “liberty,” under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
While the result of this broad language has been to expand the rights of parents in
many desirable ways, it has also expanded those rights in some very irrational ways,
as well. As Justice Kennedy noted in his dissent in Troxel:
Pierce and Meyer, had they been decided in recent times, may well have
been grounded upon First Amendment interests protecting freedom of
speech, belief, and religion.
Their formulation and subsequent
interpretation have been quite different, of course; and they have long
been interpreted to have found in Fourteenth Amendment concepts of
liberty an independent right of the parent in the “custody, care and nurture
of the child,” free from state intervention.82
It is because of such broad protections from “state interventions,” however, that
the state is often prevented from protecting children, at all. Thus, while Meyer and
Pierce firmly establish the critical autonomy of parents in the home, as stated, such
logic can also be extremely limited and too easily distorted.
3. Reciprocity
Put in most simple terms, what Meyer, Pierce, and the current conception of
parental autonomy itself all ignore is the special reciprocal nature of the parent-child
relationship. To begin with, while children are, of course, dependent on their parents
80

262 U.S. at 399.

81
Brief by William D. Guthrie for Appellee at 68, Pierce, 268 U.S. 510. In fact, this
approach has sometimes amounted to a “most dangerous form of liberty, the right to control
another human being.” Barbara Bennet Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce
and the Child As Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1001 (1992) (referring to Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
82

Id.
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for their basic sustenance, moral guidance, and their emotional and physical
wellbeing, they are indeed inherently vulnerable to all types of harm. Therefore,
parents largely regulate any opportunity children have to enjoy “life and liberty.”83
What follows then is that any time parents are granted either an irrational or
otherwise overly broad amount of protection from the state, children are being
completely cut off both from the state and the Constitution, as well. That is, children
disappear.84
The Bill of Rights “life and liberty and the pursuit of happiness” at the very least
afford all persons a status of actually existing.85 Ensuring this minimal status of
children in America is as compelling as any interest as there could ever be. While
strict scrutiny may very well be the appropriate standard for protecting most interests
of parents, this can only be so if the state is recognizing the existence of children, at
the same time.
And this is only the first part of the problem. Because the current conception of
parental autonomy is so broad, so rigid, and so ambiguous, often the only way to
recognize any interests of children has simply been to ignore the doctrine altogether.
Too often, exceptions to parental autonomy too are asserted by the state without any
clear or consistent guidelines. As a result, sometimes the interests of parents
needlessly, arbitrarily and effectively disappear under this analysis, as well.
So long as the doctrine of parental autonomy remains unclear, there will always
be an equally harmful and reciprocal impact on the substantive interests of parents.
And, so long as the primary method of analyzing these substantive rights is the use
of the more abstract legal rules instead of a clearer focus on the facts, this will
remain the case.
B. Distinguishing a Parent’s Substantive Rights
From a Parent’s Procedural Rights
The current legal analysis also fails to adequately distinguish the substantive
rights of parents (either under the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments, or under the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment)
from a parent’s procedural rights (under the procedural component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
To illustrate, any and all interests of parents enjoy certain procedural protections
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Before the state may
83

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. More to the point, there is also “the pursuit of happiness” in
the Declaration of Independence.
84

530 U.S. 57, at 89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“counseling against . . . a constitutional rule
that treats a biological parent’s liberty interest as an isolated right that may be exercised
arbitrarily”); Schall v. Martin, 407 U.S. 253, at 265 (1984) (“children are always in some form
of custody.”); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (determining liberty interests of a
parent not based on “isolated factors,” but within the context of it impact on the family as
whole).
85

Not only do children “exist,” but they have also been afforded certain fundamental rights
under the Constitution. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (children granted a
liberty interest in avoiding involuntary confinement); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v.
Danford, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (“minors as well as adults are protected by the Constitution
and possess Constitutional rights”); and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969) (establishing a First Amendment right to free speech for minors).
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ever conclude that the actions of a parent have, in fact, exceeded the parameters of
his or her legitimate, substantive rights, it must first ensure that in making that
determination, any “undue risk” of procedural error has been reduced to “realistic
and acceptable” constitutional levels.86 That is, the state must simply be fair and
efficient before it intrudes on any individual’s rights.
Again, in termination cases, for example, before the state may take this most
drastic of actions, it must: (1) clear enormous procedural hurdles in showing that a
child has, in fact, endured immense abuse and/or neglect; and (2) also show that the
state has given the parent an adequate opportunity to rehabilitate the familial
situation.87 Thus, the termination process has understandably been made a long and
meticulous process, usually lasting multiple years.88
However, often the sole purpose of these procedural hurdles is simply to ensure
that the state is clear in making these factual determinations as to the actual scope of
a parent’s substantive rights. Therefore, once the state has vast evidence, or even
actual knowledge, both of continuous and horrific abuse of a child, as well as such
evidence of a parent’s total failure to improve the situation, such procedural hurdles
no longer serve any real purpose.
At this point, such additional hurdles are not actually protecting any legitimate
parental right to raise one’s family, but only serve to keep the state from protecting
the most helpless of children. And, indeed, in many of these cases there simply are
no such ambiguous issues to be resolved.
The following analysis of the Supreme Court case of Santosky v. Kramer89 will
clearly illustrate this problem, as well as the above problems in defining the
substantive rights of parents.
VI. ILLUSTRATION #1 - SANTOSKY V. KRAMER
A. The Opinion
The Santosky case began with a determination by a New York state social agency
that the Santosky parents had, for years, both been “terminally neglecting,” as well
as horribly abusing, three of their children.90 The state finally determined that the
children were in danger of “irreparable harm” and ordered proceedings to determine
whether or not to legally and permanently terminate the Santosky’s parental rights.91
It is only once those parental rights are legally terminated that children can then be
placed for permanent adoption.
86

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 776 n. 4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

87

See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 778 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); and Santosky, 455 U.S. at
776 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88

For example, it took three years to terminate a fathers parental rights in a recent case
where the father had murdered his son’s mother. http://bostonherald.com/localregional/
view.bg:articleid=75023 “N.A. couple officially adopts boy who divorced mom-killing dad,”
Thomas Caywood (last visited March 25, 2005).
89

455 U.S. 745.

90

A fourth Santosky child, an infant when the termination proceedings began, was not
involved in the termination process. Id. at 752.
91

Id. at 747.
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In New York state, termination hearings are divided into two stages: one stage for
ensuring the due process rights of parents and one for then actually determining the
best interests of the child (this bifurcated analysis is generally mirrored in most every
state).92 In Santosky, the state had, indeed, met its threshold burden at the first, “factfinding,” stage and had shown by a preponderance of the evidence both that it had:
(1) provided the parents ample opportunity and assistance in rehabilitating their
“parental relationship” with their children,93 but that, despite doing so, (2) the parents
had still failed to adequately improve their familial situation.94 Thus, the Santoskys’
case was headed to the second, “dispositional”, stage where the court would make a
final decision as to whether or not termination of their rights would, in fact, be in the
children’s best interests.95
Prior to that hearing, however, the Santosky parents challenged the
constitutionality of the preponderance of the evidence standard at the fact-finding
stage. While this is indeed the evidentiary standard used in most civil cases, the
Santoskys argued that the critical and fundamental interests of parents required
greater safeguards – especially in the context of termination.96 Because the taking of
one’s children is so traumatic and damaging to a parent, it was argued that the law
must take extraordinary steps to ensure the justness of such a decision.97
The State of New York countered that: (1) its State legislature had already
determined that there were vast procedural measures in place that more than
adequately protected the due process rights of parents; and (2) that the state
legislature had already lowered the standard because previously there had, in fact,
been far too many children unnecessarily being left to severe abuse and neglect.98 In
fact, the parents in Santosky had already benefited from four-and-a-half years of
hearings and appeals that specifically ensured them every chance to improve their
situation.99
Thus, what was clear in the Santosky record was not only that the children had
endured years of brutal abuse and neglect and that the Santosky parents had rejected
all help for four and-a-half-years. The State of New York had further argued that the
only effect of raising the evidentiary burden to the clear and convincing standard was
to make it even harder to save the most desperate of children and proceedings would
once again be drawn out far longer than necessary. As a result, more children would
92

See, e.g., Bowen, 483 U.S. at 587 (upholding the “rationality” of the “Government’s
separate interest in distributing benefits among competing needy families in a fair way.”);
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (“the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”).
93

Santosky, at 748.

94

Id. (noting that parents are required to “substantially and continuously or repeatedly to
maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child though physically and financially able
to do so.”).
95

Id.

96

Id. at 756.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 761 n. 11, 763, n.13.

99

Id. at 776 n.4.
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be left to their broken homes or to a horribly broken foster care system, for much
longer periods of time, as well.100 It would seem particularly true in termination
cases that “justice delayed is truly justice denied.”101
New York’s state appellate and superior courts102 agreed with the state and
affirmed the “preponderance” standard. The Santosky parents then appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court majority in Santosky relied on Meyer and Pierce, and their
progeny, in invalidating the preponderance of the evidence standard.103 First, the
Court determined that because the harm to the parental interest from termination is
so “grievous,”104 as well as “permanent,”105 and because there is such a strong
societal preference to err on the side of keeping families “united,”106 the interests of
the Santosky parents were deemed to be “greater” than the interests of the Santosky
children.107 The majority thus held that the “only” way to ensure that the greater
status of parents—and thus to properly reflect “the value society places on individual
liberty” (meaning the liberty of the Santosky parents)—was the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard.108 In contrast, the “preponderance” standard was said to only
afford parents an equal status with children and, therefore, it was declared to be
“constitutionally intolerable.”109
The majority specifically identified how the higher evidentiary standard serves to
protect both the substantive and the procedural components of a parent’s Due
Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. The Substantive Rights of Parents
The Santosky majority held that the clear and convincing standard was necessary
so as to ensure the substantive interests of parents. The Court’s reasoning was that
under the clear and convincing standard, obviously the state would be failing to meet
its burden at the fact-finding stage. As the second hearing will thus not be occurring
as often, there will again be less intrusion and more families left intact, as per the
parent’s wishes.
In other words, in many cases a court will leave a family intact and not allow
termination based only on an assessment of a parent’s rights in the “custody, control
and care” of their children. As the harms inflicted on the children as a result of
100

Id. at 790 n.15.

101

The Quotations Page (quoting William Gladstone) available at http://www.quotations
page.com/quote/28904.html (last visited on February 9, 2005).
102

Matter of John AA, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (1980).

103

455 U.S. at 757.

104

Id. at 756.

105

Id. at 759.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 758 n.4.

108

Id. at 756.

109

Id. at 768; see also id. at 766 (“A standard that allocates the risk of error nearly equally
between these two outcomes does not reflect properly their relative severity.”).
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leaving the family together are thereby totally ignored in such decisions, those
interests are effectively relegated to a “lesser” constitutional status. In this way the
analysis was said to be further “balanced” in favor of the greater parental interests.110
The majority did acknowledge the obvious in that both children (as well as foster
parents) are “deeply interested” in the outcome of that fact-finding hearing.111 Yet,
the Court further decided that at the initial stage “the focus is emphatically not on
them,”112 but on the due process rights of the parents only.
2. The Procedural Rights of Parents
Because of the factual ambiguities of termination cases (such as those discussed
in the first part of this Article), the Santosky majority noted that there is a particularly
high risk that a procedural error committed by a social worker, psychologist, lawyer,
or judge, could cause a parent’s rights to be terminated.113 However, because
termination is so devastating to a parent, the Court held that the procedural
safeguards in these cases must be increased accordingly, as well.114 While it is true
that even if the risk of error can never be eliminated altogether, the clear and
convincing standard can at least ensure that the analysis is favoring the more valued
parental interest. Thus, any potential procedural error in these cases is made less
likely to harm a parent, and the state is more likely to leave the family intact, as per
the parent’s wishes.
Of course, while the higher evidentiary standard also ensures that the state will be
unable to intervene on behalf of nearly as many abused and neglected children, or in
anywhere near as timely a fashion,115 precedence was given to further favor the more
valued parental interest.
B. The Problem With Santosky
The Santosky analysis relies on two flawed conclusions, which are addressed in
the next two section of this Article.
1. The “Disappearing” Substantive Interests
The first problem in Santosky is that the analysis fails to “balance” the
substantive interests of parents, children, and the state, at all. In reality, the children
were simply eclipsed from the analysis altogether.

110

Id. at 768.

111

See 455 U.S. at 759.

112

Id.

113

See supra note 9; see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 776 n.4. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(noting the realities of the law and that the goal of due process is not perfection but to remove
“undue certainty”).
114
The parental interest is deemed “commanding.” See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (quoting
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
115

Fitzgerald, supra note 9. “Instead of seeking timely termination of parental rights to
free these children for adoption, after Santosky, state agencies now maintain more children in
foster homes and for longer periods while accumulating “clear and convincing evidence” of
abuse or neglect.” Id. at 63.
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Under a bifurcated hearing process, decisions are being made to defer to parents
and leave families intact prior to any second hearing even occurs. Therefore, in
many cases the analysis ends before there has been any consideration of how leaving
the family together will actually impact the children, the foster parents, or the
state.116 These interests are made irrelevant.
In fact, this flaw exists even under the lower “preponderance” standard, as well—
-the clear and convincing standard only exacerbates the problem. For example,
where the evidence is clear under any standard that there has been “shockingly
abusive treatment,” as in Santosky, over any period of time, one wonders exactly
what additional due process hurdles would be needed to prevent terminating those
parents’ rights? How much terror does a parent have a right to inflict on a child?
How many years of one’s childhood must one be forced to forfeit? Yet, under the
bifurcated process, our courts may take years to further examine what they already
know beyond any reasonable doubt. In fact, it is specifically because the interests of
the child are not present in the analysis that there is no way to clearly determine the
bounds of what the parental rights actually consist of, or have any reference point for
keeping them in check, they are unlimited.
Even further, under the current conception of parental autonomy, the bifurcated
process inexplicably ensures that even those facts most relevant to a termination
decision may never even enter the court’s analysis. Never even factored into the
Santosky opinion was an evidentiary record that in no uncertain terms documented
the “shockingly abusive treatment” of the Santosky children, including years of
regular and extreme emotional abuse as well as beatings, including, as one example,
one child’s femur being broken and then treated with a homemade splint, as well as
cuts, blisters, “pin pricks” on one child’s back, severe malnutrition, and so on.117
Thus, the Santosky analysis is utterly out of touch with the very facts that were
before the Court. As a result, the majority was left to try to force the facts to fit into
its formalistic analysis. Illustrative is that the majority ultimately determined that to
leave the children with the Santosky parents, or, at best, to otherwise needlessly keep
those children stuck in a horribly broken foster care system indefinitely, was merely
the maintaining of an “uneasy status quo.”118 Reflecting the deep flaws both of the
majority analysis, and the current conception of parental autonomy itself, the
importance of the interests of the Santosky children was dismissed as being only
“comparatively slight” in relation to the “greater” interests of parents in the home.119
Finally, it is also worth noting that the majority rationalized its exclusion of the
interests of the children and the foster parents from that first hearing simply by
stating that the “focus” was not yet on them.120 Yet, obviously the children and the
foster parents are impacted by that decision. The only reason the “focus” was not on
either was because the majority itself had chosen to ignore them.

116

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 766 n.14.

117

Id. at 781 n. 10.

118

Id. at 758.

119

Id. at 781 n. 10.

120

Id. at 759.
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2. A Nominal Increase in the Procedural Protections of Parents
The second major flaw in Santosky was that the majority assumed that increasing
the evidentiary standard to one of clear and convincing evidence would actually then
better protect parents in a meaningful sense. In truth, however, New York already
had other “exhaustive” safeguards in place that prevented any procedural errors from
actually causing parental rights to be erroneously terminated. Therefore, any actual
increase in protections for parents is nominal, at best.
As Justice Rehnquist discussed at length in his dissent, a narrow focus solely on
one aspect of those procedural safeguards—the evidentiary standard—is a clear
misreading of the true requirements of due process.121 Simply put, the real test is
whether the “overall effect”122 of the entire “scheme of procedural protections”123 in
place do, in fact, reduce the risk of error to “realistic and acceptable constitutional
levels” or not .124
And there can be no doubt as to whether the Santosky parents were protected by
“realistic and acceptable” safeguards. The facts of Santosky were entirely
unambiguous both in showing that the parents had horribly abused and neglected
their children, for years, and, further, that the parents had then benefited from
“exhaustive” procedural safeguards, including the four-and-a-half years125 of
appointments, meetings, court hearings (seven full hearings, to be exact) and appeals,
all to no avail.126 Even further it was equally clear that the Santosky parents had
completely “rebuffed,” and had even been “hostile” towards all such state help.127
Long before their final “fact-finding” hearing, the Santosky parents had enjoyed
what must have seemed to be an endless series of opportunities and safeguards.
Any risk, then, that a significant procedural error would not have been exposed at
some point during the termination process in Santosky (and then actually been the
proximate cause of an erroneous termination) had effectively been eliminated. This
means that there was no logical nor legal reason for the majorities’ “obsessive” focus
on the evidentiary standard by itself.128
Finally, and as Justice Rehnquist again noted, this nominal risk of error can be
clarified even further. What is not at risk at termination hearings is that the state will
ever arbitrarily take away someone’s children. The only parents actually facing even
this nominal additional risk of error under the “preponderance” standard at these
hearings would be parents already known to be incredibly disturbed; known to have
already subjected their children to an “irreparable threat of injury,” for years; and
121

Id. at 777.

122

Id. (emphasis added).

123

Id. at 775.

124

“[N]ot all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kinds of
procedures.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 774-75, (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1992)) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
125

Id. at 782.

126

Id. at 771 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

127

Id. at 784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the Family Court’s finding).

128

Id. at 785 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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that are known to have subsequently and utterly failed to take advantage of
“exhaustive” opportunities to make changes.129
Thus, in light of the risk of incredible harm to children, it is beyond question that
the risk of procedural error in New York had, in fact, been reduced to “realistic and
acceptable constitutional levels” of due process.130 As Justice Rehnquist put it
simply, at some point the Court must finally say, “enough is enough.”131
3. Santosky in Summary
In summary, Santosky affords no more than a nominal increase in procedural
protections for parents—parents already known to be horribly disturbed, yet
incredibly well protected by the law. Yet, the opinion has otherwise caused
thousands of helpless and hopeless children to unnecessarily endure physical,
emotional and psychological torment, for far longer periods of time, if not
indefinitely, to be left in a horribly broken foster care system for longer;132 and,
ultimately, to be denied even a minimum of the emotional development and those
basic “opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed . . .
citizens” usually enjoyed in one’s childhood years.133 Thus, under this logic, the
interests of many children are not just minimized under the legal analysis, but they
truly disappear.
VII. WHAT PARENTAL AUTONOMY IS SUPPOSED TO MEAN
What has been made clear in Part Two of this Article then is that too often the
current legal analysis of the family has lost sight entirely of the true purpose of the
doctrine of parental autonomy. This doctrine can really be summarized by two very
simple rules. First, the substantive rights of parents in the home must be strong and
clearly defined. Second, all evidentiary and procedural standards governing the
parent-child relationship must also be strong, and must generally favor protecting the
actions and preferences of parents in the home.
At the same time, common sense dictates that the only way there can ever be real
justice in any case is if the facts themselves are examined before any such
assumptions or final determinations are made. If after thoroughly analyzing the facts
in a case it is still either: (1) ambiguous as to whether or not a legitimate, substantive
129
Id. at 790. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also noted that the
requirements of due “process are to be as realistic as possible,” yet not necessarily “perfect.”
Id. at 776 n.4. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130

Id. at 776 n.4. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

131

Id. at 783. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Also worth noting is that the Santosky majority
argued that termination proceedings must have the same level of due process as traffic
offenses, which also use the clear-and-convincing standard. Id. at 767-768.
132

The suffering endured in the American foster care system is shocking by any measure.
See, e.g., Timothy Roche, The Crisis of Foster Care, TIME, Nov. 13, 2000 at 74 (“Five years
ago, there were about a quarter of a million children in the country’s foster care systems.
Today that number has doubled, to between 550,000 and 560,000 children . . . . However,
neglect and a quagmire of child-swallowing bureaucracies plague the system”); see also
Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 63 (documenting the effects of Santosky in causing children to be
removed from homes less often and left in foster care for even longer).
133

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 790. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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parental right is actually at stake, or not; or, (2) if it remains ambiguous as to whether
a child is actually being harmed, then the law must in fact assume that parental
actions or preferences at issue require constitutional protections.
However, in any case where it is clear that there is not any legitimate, substantive
parental right even at stake, and it is clear that a child in fact is actually and
unnecessarily being harmed, then no assumptions need to be made. A court need not
assume that the parent is doing a “good” job or that there should be more hoops to be
jumped through. To otherwise blindly make such unnecessary or irrational
assumptions such as these will always violate any standard of constitutional due
process.
Part Three of this Article sets forth an analysis that puts these basic ideals back to
the forefront of the legal analysis.
PART THREE: A SOLUTION
VIII. INTRODUCTION TO THE SINGLE OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS
It is well established under the law that parents have a fundamental constitutional
right to make most day-to-day decisions affecting a child. Any factual and legal
ambiguities that arise in cases involving the parent-child relationship are generally
resolved in favor of the actions and preferences of parents. Further, parents have a
basic duty toward the “high care” of their children,134 while the state may have some
corresponding level of duty to provide for children when their parents do not.135
And, finally, under certain circumstances, children themselves have been granted
fundamental rights.136
None of the above would change under the Single Objective Analysis. First, the
law would still be following the doctrine of parental autonomy the vast majority of
the time. Primarily what would change under this analysis is simply that: (1) the
facts of these cases would always be the initial focus of any legal analysis; and (2)
the interests of every parent and child would at least be acknowledged, in every case.
After an initial examination of the factual record, the next step under this analysis
would be to then either cite to parental autonomy—and the analysis would simply
end with the parental interest prevailing—or, certain circumstances could trigger a
further analysis under the Single Objective Analysis itself, so as to determine if state
intervention may or may not be appropriate.
Such “triggering events” are already clearly established under the law. For
example, in the termination context, the Single Objective Analysis would only be
triggered with a finding of “permanent neglect,” or a threat of “irreparable harm,” to
a child – such as in Santosky. What would trigger this analysis in other aspects of
the parent-child relationship would continue to vary depending on the interests at
stake.
In visitation cases, for example, a likely requirement would be a showing that the
third party petitioner had a major role in the child’s life, perhaps such as having
134

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.

135

Reno, 507 U.S. at 302 (“where the custody of the parent or legal guardian fails, the
government may (indeed, we have said must) either exercise custody itself or appoint someone
else to do so.” (emphasis in original)).
136

See supra note 83.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005

27

312

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:285

actually raised the child for a substantial period of time; and perhaps also requiring a
showing that the third party represented one of the only strong relationships the child
had in his or her life.137 In short, only when the potential harm to a child was clearly
and sufficiently great enough, and the risk to a parent clearly and relatively low
would state intervention ever be an option under the Single Objective Analysis.
IX. THE SINGLE OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS
The Single Objective Analysis itself is grounded in the following simple premise:
The true purpose of the family is to produce happy, well adjusted, and disciplined
children. This represents what I will call the “Single Objective” of the family. This
goal is stated broadly enough so that it will be able to be applied in any legal or
factual context; yet, it is focused enough so that the law need not ever lose sight of
the most critical interests of the family. Further, here the most important interests of
the family: parental authority and the basic well-being of children; are the very
foundation of the analysis. Additional guidelines further ensure an optimal analysis.
To demonstrate, the first step under this analysis will simply be to examine the
facts themselves and objectively determine what would best achieve the Single
Objective. For example, severe abuse, over a long period of time would suggest that
termination of a parent’s rights would best achieve the Single Objective. This initial
determination would then be further qualified under a second stage of analysis.
Certain “Key Principles,” each traditionally accepted as essential for healthy
families, will then provide this analysis with optimal safeguards and parameters.
To illustrate, the first such principal is to always maintain the critical importance
of parental authority in the home. Therefore, no initial determination could be valid
if it undermined the legitimate authority of parents. For example, a judge could not
override a parent’s preferences for who visits one’s child, or how often, except under
very clearly defined and special circumstances, such as those given above.
How parental authority and the basic interests of children would further be
defined then is that our courts would establish certain rules, beginning with only the
most obvious of parental rights of authority and the most minimal interests of
children, and gradually clarify those definitions on a case-by-case basis, when
appropriate.138 The remainder of this Article will set forth the foundation for such an
analysis.
Ultimately, the Single Objective Analysis not only will best ensure the authority
of parents in the home, but it will also best ensure the most basic interests of
children, as well. These interests will then be analyzed within the most logical, most
just, and most consistent legal framework possible.
The Single Objective Analysis is stated as follows:
Parents have a fundamental right to raise and enjoy their families, as well as a
corresponding duty to support and protect their children. Before state intervention

137

See, infra, the analyses of DeShaney (state liability in protecting children), Troxel
(visitation), and DeBoer v. Schmidt (adoption and custody). In other words, the state is not
intervening in the family anytime a child could get a “better deal” down the street with the
Jones’, but only in those cases where there is an obvious and legitimate reason for doing so.
138
This process will mirror what modern philosopher John Rawls’ referred to as a
“reflexive equilibrium.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). In fact, the Single
Objective Analysis will hopefully mirror Rawls’ theories in several ways.
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can be considered in any given scenario involving the parent-child relationship, the
state must first weigh the risk of harm of any intrusion on the parental interest
against the potential risk of harm to a child if no state action is taken. If a legitimate
reason to consider state intervention, further analysis will be required under the
Single Objective Analysis.
A. The Single Objective
The Single Objective of the law is to help parents provide their children an
opportunity to be happy, well adjusted, and disciplined. Thus, the individual liberty
interests of parent, child, and state in a given case are those interests that do, in fact,
best advance the Single Objective itself.
The interests of parent and child identified above are then qualified by each of the
following five Key Principles: (1) Parental Authority; (2) Evidentiary and Procedural
Safeguards Favor Parents; (3) The Direct Effect of Every Decision on the Basic
Interests of Parents and Children are Examined Individually; (4) Time-Tested
Principles; and (5) Relevance of a Parent’s Financial Situation are Minimized.
B. The Key Principles
1. Parental Authority
Parental authority is the paramount interest in the family. Any acts or
preferences of a parent that effectuate legitimate discipline and guidance in the home
always supersede any other interest in the home.
2. Evidentiary and Procedural Safeguards Favor Parents
The various evidentiary and procedural standards that govern the parent-child
relationship will generally favor parental rights (under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment) so that legal or factual ambiguities in the record are
resolved in favor of parents. The appropriate level of substantive and procedural
protections for parental rights will continue to vary depending on the risk at stake
(i.e. higher protections for parents in termination cases; relatively lower protections
when determining visitation rights).
3. The Direct Effect of Every Decision on the Basic Interests of Parents and
Children are Examined Individually
The individual liberty interests of parent and child are distinct from one another.
No final decision affecting the parent-child relationship can be made before its direct
impact on both parent and child has been acknowledged. Therefore, the interests of
any parent or child are never allowed to “disappear” in any given case. Further, the
identifying of these distinct individual liberty interests will better allow the law to
hold parents, children, and the state, all accountable for their respective actions, as
well, thus leading to more lasting solutions to problems in the family.
4. Time-Tested Principles
Generally, the only rights in the family that enjoy status as fundamental rights
under the constitution will continue to be those “traditionally” recognized as being
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beneficial to families.139 The relatively arbitrary preferences of a single Justice or of
a single opinion are prevented from having a disproportionate impact in determining
how the family is treated under the Constitution.
5. Relevance of a Parent’s Financial Situation Minimized
The only financial factors that can be weighed against the interests of a parent
will be those that rise to levels of abandonment or neglect. The Single Objective
only requires minimum levels of financial stability in the home.
In short, a child’s constitutional right is simply to enjoy a minimal opportunity to
be happy, well adjusted, and disciplined. A parent’s right is the ability to provide his
or her child the same.
The remainder of this Article will be devoted to demonstrating the immense
practicability of the Single Objective Analysis. This will be demonstrated through
re-examining Santosky and Troxel, as well as through the examination of some other
important family law cases.
X. APPLICATION OF THE SINGLE OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS
A. Illustration #1: Revisiting Santosky Under the Single Objective Analysis
In the termination context, the Single Objective Analysis would again only be
triggered by findings either of “terminal neglect” or of a threat of “irreparable harm”
to a child. Thus, the facts in Santosky clearly would have triggered the analysis.
Based upon the vast and unequivocal evidence of abuse and neglect of the
Santosky children, and in light of the four-and-a-half years of completely failed
attempts by the Santosky parents to rehabilitate their behavior, the Single Objective
of happy, well adjusted, and disciplined children was clearly not being attained in the
Santosky home. The factual record in Santosky speaks for itself and the Santosky
children’s best chance at the Single Objective would lie in the termination of their
parents’ parental rights.140
The justness of a decision to terminate is made even clearer when examined
under the five Key Principles:
1. Parental Authority: The actions of the Santosky parents went far beyond
the scope of any conceivable conception of parental authority or discipline.
2. Evidentiary and Procedural Safeguards Favoring Parents: Under any
evidentiary standard, and despite exhaustive procedural safeguards, the
actions of the Santosky parents were known to directly negate the Single
139

This principle is already established under Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 (recognizing
only those individual liberty interests enjoying the “historic respect . . . traditionally accorded
to the relationships that develop within the unitary family.”). Of course, the thrust of the
Single Objective Analysis is that there has never been any legitimate, fundamental right of
parents to actually negate the recognition of a child’s very existence, and vice versa. Any
opinion or law that interprets a parent’s or a child’s rights to exceed or fall short of such
rational boundaries is clearly in error and, as a direct contradiction of the Bill of Rights itself,
must be unconstitutional. See Part Two of this Article, supra.
140

The Single Objective itself, by definition, will result in the best interests of not only
parents, children and the state, but also of foster parents. Thus, the interests of foster parents
under each of the Key Principles would simply be one more factor to be included in the
analysis.
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Objective. In short, as there is nothing factually ambiguous in the Santosky
record, there is no reason to otherwise err on the side of the Santosky
parents’ stated wishes of keeping the family intact. Thus, so long as other
exhaustive procedural protections are in place, there is no reason to suggest
that the preponderance of the evidence standard is not constitutional in this
context.
3. The Direct Effect of Every Decision on the Basic Interests of Parents and
Children are Examined Individually: The effect of not terminating the
Santoskys’ parental rights was to completely negate the individual liberty
interests of the Santosky children. Instead, the Santosky children must be
granted at least a minimal opportunity to have childhood years free from
severe suffering, abuse, and neglect, and to obtain basic life skills to take
into adulthood. Additionally, the Santosky parents had no “right” to
continue to ruin the lives of their children once afforded exhaustive help to
change their situation.
Also, bifurcated termination hearings, at least as set forth in Santosky, would not
be constitutional, as in some cases the interests of children will be totally eclipsed
from the final decision under even the lowest of evidentiary standards.
4. Time-tested Principles: Under the given facts, curtailing severe abuse and
neglect and providing children permanent adoptive homes as soon as
possible is clearly of benefit to those children, as well as to society.141
5. The Relevance of a Parent’s Financial Situation is Minimized: The abuse
and neglect of the Santosky children transcended any socio-economic
issues.
In short, the preponderance of the evidence standard could be constitutional in the
termination context, while the bifurcated hearing process likely would not.
And to reiterate, the only parents facing even a remote chance of a nominal
increase in risk of an erroneous termination decision under the preponderance
standard would be those already known to have had extraordinary problems, for
years, and whose problems had then continued unabated despite exhaustive state
help. Yet, the trade-off is to otherwise recognize the most minimal interests of
thousands of children otherwise never to be heard at any hearing. The only
significant effect then of lowering the evidentiary standard, and of restructuring the
bifurcation process, is to prevent children from actually disappearing under the law.

141
The issue has been raised that because the foster care system is in such a sorry state, that
termination of parental rights should perhaps be a less attractive of an option for courts. See
Roche, supra note 128; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 765 n.15 (“permanent removal from that home
will not necessarily improve his welfare.”). First, however, the solution is clearly not for the
courts to abandon the foster care system, but for the state to finally make it a priority. Further,
the plight of the Santosky children was so extreme that the chances of them enduring
equivalent abuse and neglect in any given foster home was still unlikely. More importantly,
the courts should not abandon logic, to accommodate a system that is failing even minimal
standards. The issue becomes whether or not these children are worth extra attention and
resources?
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B. Illustration #2: DeShaney v. Winnebago
1. The Opinion
A second Supreme Court case, DeShaney v. Winnebago,142 further illustrates how
the Single Objective Analysis could transform this area of the law.
Throughout a two-year period, Randy DeShaney had severely and continuously
physically abused his four-year-old son, Joshua. In the end, Joshua was beaten into a
coma, suffered permanent brain damage, and was ultimately confined to an
institution for the profoundly retarded for the rest of his life.143
Throughout the period of Joshua’s abuse, the Wisconsin social agency involved
in his case had knowledge both of what was happening to him, as well as the further
danger he was in. Yet, for various reasons, the agency failed to remove Joshua from
his home.144 Joshua’s mother then filed a lawsuit against the state, on Joshua’s
behalf. The mother asserted that because the state failed to perform its job, it had
violated Joshua’s substantive due process rights to “life and liberty” under the
Fourteenth Amendment.145
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the mother’s claim. The Court held
that the state’s duty to protect individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment applied
only to affirmative state actions, such as harms committed by state actors
themselves, or for harms to children in the actual physical custody of the state, such
as in state-sponsored foster homes.146 While the Court acknowledged that state
liability may be created if there is a special relationship involved, such as with
incarcerated criminals or the institutionalized mentally ill, Joshua DeShaney did not
qualify for such treatment.147 The majority held that while “the state may have been
aware” of the environment Joshua was living in, the dangers he faced there, and then
knowingly allowed him to be severely beaten for over two years, it “played no part
in [the] creation of that environment.”148 Therefore, the state was not liable.
However, the DeShaney Court’s focus on a distinction as to whether the state’s
failures were merely a long series of gross omissions – as opposed to being
“affirmative” mistakes – was pure semantics.149 The effect then, and just as in
Santosky, was to render the most minimal interests of the child nonexistent.

142

DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189.

143

Id. at 193.

144
The only explanation given in the opinion was that the social agency “team” had
decided that there was not enough evidence of abuse to intervene. Id. at 192. The majority
defended the team’s decisions by saying that they were probably leery of being sued for
intruding on Randy DeShaney’s rights. Id. at 203. Of course, given the facts of DeShaney,
the problem is not over-intrusive social workers, but how the given facts could leave any such
concern?
145

Id.

146

Id. at 197.

147

Id.

148

Id. at 201.

149

Id. at 197 (Blackmon, J., dissenting).
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The truth of the matter is that Joshua, like any toddler, was utterly helpless at the
hands of his father, both legally and physically. This is precisely what makes the
parent-child relationship “special.” The Court has even acknowledged this basic
truth under other circumstances: “‘[J]uveniles, unlike adults, are always in some
form of custody,’ and where the custody of the parent or legal guardian fails, the
government may (indeed, we have said must) either exercise custody itself or appoint
someone else to do so.”150
Yet, here the state chose to do nothing. And, of course, no private citizen could
have helped Joshua by removing him from his home as the state would most
definitely arrest such a person for kidnapping, and then return Joshua to his father.151
Therefore, the state itself had effectively ensured that Randy DeShaney – and Randy
DeShaney alone – was to be responsible for the “life and liberty” of Joshua
DeShaney. Of course, the reality was that it had long been common knowledge
amongst the DeShaney’s neighbors, Joshua’s mother, social workers, and numerous
medical personnel, that for years Randy DeShaney had been horribly violating the
interests of Joshua.
2. DeShaney Under the Single Objective Analysis
DeShaney would, of course, come out completely differently under the Single
Objective Analysis. First, the severe abuse endured by Joshua would obviously
trigger this analysis. Next, evidence indicating that the Single Objective was not
being attained in the DeShaney home reads as follows: (1) seven independent reports
from social workers and doctors indicating an extreme likelihood of child abuse; (2)
a complete and extended lack of any cooperation from the parent; (3) multiple
independent reports from neighbors of severe abuse; (4) three trips to the emergency
room, each strongly suspected to be abuse by medical personnel;152 and (5) a social
worker’s testimony that she had known that Joshua was being severely harmed and
that she had known that the situation was to get far worse without intervention.153
The only rational conclusion from these facts then is that knowingly allowing a
child to be severely and continuously beaten does not best ensure the Single
Objective. Where the state even had actual knowledge that it could easily ensure the
Single Objective, and it was the only entity that could do so, it must be held
accountable for its conduct. Whether one characterizes that conduct as “omissions,”
“inactions,” “carelessness,” or “recklessness,” etc., is irrelevant. The truth of the
matter is that anything less then a minimum level of state accountability means that
children such as Joshua DeShaney needlessly disappear. This is the special and
unique nature of the parent-child relationship.

150

Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
151

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the State “law invites –
indeed, directs – citizens and other governmental entities to depend on local departments of
social services such as respondent to protect children from abuse”.).
152

Id. at 192.

153

Id. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing social worker’s testimony: “I just knew the
phone would ring one day and Joshua would be dead.”).
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Further, state liability is the all-too clear result when DeShaney is examined
under each of the Key Principles, as well:
1. Parental Authority:
Randy DeShaney’s actions far exceeded any
conceivable conception of parental authority.
2. Evidentiary and Procedural Standards Favoring Parents: The state had
actual knowledge that the Single Objective was not being attained.
3. The Direct Effect of Every Decision on the Basic Interests of Parents and
Children are Examined Individually: If the state is not held accountable at
some level, then Joshua DeShaney’s constitutional interests disappear. As
for Randy DeShaney, under the given facts there was no conceivable,
legitimate parental “right” upon which state intervention would have
infringed.
4. Time-Tested Principles: Abuse as was endured by Joshua DeShaney is
unacceptable.
5. Finances: There were no financial considerations to be weighed in the
DeShaney analysis.
Due to the special nature of the parent-child relationship, under some
circumstances the Constitution mandates state intervention in the home.
However, the “semantics” argument, there is a more practical concern in that the
creation of state liability in cases like DeShaney could lead to massive government
liability in other cases. The fear is that such an increased exposure to lawsuits could
create a financial disincentive for social agencies that may otherwise become more
reluctant to extend their services to as many children. Thus, the ultimate impact of
such a decision would actually be harmful to children.
Yet, this logic fails. First, similar laws creating state liability—under a standard
of actual knowledge—have not seen unusual increases in litigation.154 Even further,
the most important question to ask here is simply what price to place on the lives of
children? All that is being asked of the state in this scenario is that if it has actual
knowledge that a human being’s life is in imminent and grave danger; that individual
is utterly helpless; the state can easily help; the state is the only entity that can do so;
then the state should, in fact, help.155 To suggest that such a standard is onerous or
not worth taxpayer money is absurd. In fact, given the special nature of the parentchild relationship, such logic renders the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of
Rights itself.
C. Illustration #3: Revisiting Troxel
Bringing the Single Objective Analysis current, this approach is also easily
applied in the previously discussed Troxel case.

154
See Steven F. Heufner, Note, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After DeShaney,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1961-62 (1990) (citing studies examining litigation since the 1988
promulgation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which created liability for deprivation of constitutional
rights under color of state law). But see DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196-97.
155

In fact, it is hard to imagine the same argument being made to save a few dollars in this
manner were it the life of an adult that was at stake.
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1. Background
Again, in Troxel two grandparents had petitioned for increased visits with their
grandchildren, which the children’s mother had then opposed.156 At issue was an
exceptionally broad Washington state visitation statute that allowed “any” person to
apply for visitation rights with a child. According to this law, visitation would then
be granted any time a judge deemed such visits to be in a child’s best interests.157
In deciding in favor of the grandparents, the trial judge had noted that children
usually benefit from such contact with their grandparents, and even added that as a
child he himself had greatly benefited from visits with his own grandparents.158
Thus, as no evidence had been presented to show otherwise, the trial court presumed
that the increased visits with the grandparents would be in the children’s best
interests.159
Yet, the Supreme Court reversed that decision in favor of the mother’s
preferences. Again, the fact that no evidence had shown that the mother’s preference
was not in her children’s best interests meant that her preference must be protected
under the doctrine of parental autonomy.
Furthermore, the Troxel Court also noted that the statute in question was so
broadly worded that a court could essentially ignore parents’ wishes anytime it
disagreed with a parental decision.160 This would mean that a court could arbitrarily
replace its judgment for that of a parent’s anytime it was believed that he or she
could do a “better” job of parenting,161 a clear violation of parental autonomy. As a
result, the statute itself was struck down as an overly broad infringement on the
constitutional interests of parents.162
2. Troxel Under the Single Objective Analysis
Under the Single Objective Analysis, the mother’s preferences for her children
would have still prevailed in Troxel, although for slightly different reasons than those
given by the plurality. The Washington state visitation statute would not be
constitutional, but it could be saved with some fairly simple revisions.
To begin, the reason the visitation statute had been made so broad was to account
for the wide array of living situations of children in society today, such as where a
third party is the only positive relationship the child has ever known.163 Thus, any
such statute must not only account for the more common familial situations, but also
for the more complex, as well.
156

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72.

157

Id. at 61.

158

Id. at 72 (explaining that the Trial Judge referred to his childhood visits with his
grandparents: “I look back on some personal experiences . . . . it happened to workout in our
family that [it] turned out to be an enjoyable experience.”).
159

Id.

160

Id. at 63.

161

Id.

162

Id. at 73.

163

See id. at 63-64 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3)).
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Yet, and as specifically noted by two of the Justices, the plurality’s goal of
preventing inappropriate persons from petitioning for visitation rights is more easily
and more effectively achieved through other means.164 For example, many states
simply require third parties to make a prima facie showing that the petitioner already
has at least a “substantial relationship” with the child.165 In this way, frivolous
applications are still easily eliminated, but the law is able to retain a necessary
flexibility.
In Troxel, as the children had spent considerable time visiting their father at the
grandparents’ home, this perhaps could have been enough to get the grandparents to
the Single Objective Analysis.
Again, the real problem in these cases is that some factual ambiguities are not
easily clarified.166 Of course, whether a parent can prove that he or she has a good
reason for a decision or not, parental autonomy would still control the outcomes. In
Troxel, as no evidence was presented to show otherwise, the mother’s rejection of
the increased visits would still be assumed to be in her children’s best interest.
Given the “slender findings” supporting the grandparents’ argument in Troxel, this
would be the appropriate decision.167
Yet, while the outcomes of the vast majority of cases would not be altered under
the Single Objective Analysis, in at least some cases asking the better questions
would indeed lead to more just results. For example, did the mother oppose the
visits for what she personally believed to be the best interests of the child, or perhaps
it was for some clearly irrational reason? And exactly what evidence was there to
show what the children’s relationship was with their grandparents? If the
grandparents had actually been raising the children (which they apparently had not),
what evidence then was there to suggest that this home was a healthy place to live, or
not?
In short, all the Single Objective Analysis really requires is that a court actually
examine the entire factual record before assuming anything.
3. Shifting the Focus
By shifting the initial focus of every case to the facts, the law can then utilize
evidentiary and procedural safeguards that better correspond to the realities of each
case. For example, instead of a less clear, and too often irrationally broad
presumption that favors parents, a more realistic solution would simply be to analyze
all of the facts for what they are, and objectively determine the Single Objective. In
the visitation context, the parental interest could perhaps be protected by what may
be a better-defined standard of “substantially clear” evidence (falling between the

164
See id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 25-27
(Wash. 1998) “most notably the statut[e] do[es] not require the petitioner to establish that he
or she has a substantial relationship with the child.”). This requirement is already in place in
at least ten States. See id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
165

Id.

166

Justice Kennedy raised this issue in his concurrence where he opined that a remand was
in order so that the trial court could actually determine some of these basic and critical factual
issues. Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
167

See supra note 70 (referring to “slender findings” favoring grandparents request).
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preponderance of the evidence and the clear and convincing evidence standards).
This standard would be a more rational acknowledgment of the important, yet
ambiguous, nature of these interests.168
Therefore, a third party seeking visitation rights under the Single Objective
Analysis would first have to make a prima facie showing of a substantial relationship
with a child; and then must further show that: (1) granting visitation would clearly
not be an unnecessary infringement on any legitimate rights of the parent; and, that
(2) such visits would clearly be in the child’s “best interests.” The parental interest
would still prevail except under some very unusual circumstances. Therefore, the
state would never be infringing on the interests of parents in an “arbitrary” or
“oppressive” manner, but only when the facts presented very special and easily
identifiable circumstances.
D. Asking the Right Questions—DeBoer v. Schmidt
The highly publicized adoption case of DeBoer v. Schmidt169 serves as a final
illustration as to how the analysis of the parent-child relationship could shift the
focus to the most relevant facts of each case. DeBoer involved a biological mother
who had legally relinquished her child for adoption upon birth, but who then had a
change of heart; a biological father who had abandoned two previous children, but
who had wanted to raise the child in this case; a caring adoptive family that had
formed a close relationship in raising that same child for two years; and the young
girl caught in the middle.170
For the purposes of this Article—but at the risk of oversimplifying a fairly
complex case (the DeBoer analysis also concerned a conflict of state and federal
laws)171—the Supreme Court’s analysis in DeBoer ultimately amounted to a
balancing of the individual liberty interests of the birth parents (i.e. parental
autonomy) against the third-party rights of adoptive parents. In the end, parental
autonomy prevailed, and the birth parents regained their parental rights and custody
of the child.

168

A recent case that raises some interesting issues is the Pennsylvania case of Douglas v.
Wright, 801 A.2d 586 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). In Douglas, three children had had daily contact
with their maternal grandparents for years. When the children’s mother then died in a car
accident, the father moved to block visits by the grandparents. The appellate court held that
the trial court had appropriately placed the burden on the grandparents both to show that the
visits would be in the children’s “best interests,” and that such visits would not interfere with
the parent-child relationship. What is interesting is that even based on the facts given above, it
is easy to imagine the potential for some wildly varying circumstances in these cases. On the
one hand, such a case could be about a bitter and selfish father who would look to hurt his inlaws – even if it meant hurting his already grieving children. Yet, on the other hand, perhaps
the grandparents – while having never been physically abusive to the children, could well be
emotionally disturbed or hurtful individuals, as well. The point, is that such situations require
a solid protection of a parent’s wishes which a standard of substantially clear evidence should
be able to provide. Another fascinating question is what weight to give a mother’s wishes for
her children, even tough deceased?
169

DeBoer v. Schmidt, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993).

170

Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 70.

171

Id. at 74.
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However, and regardless of whether the end-result in DeBoer was necessarily the
best decision or not, the Court’s analysis again really hinged on over-simplified and
overly formalistic legal rules. As one commentator summarized, “Like property
owners resisting a DeBoer adverse possession claim, the Schmidt’s sought quiet title
in and exclusive possession of the child.”172 In fact, the Court never even took into
account how each of the interested parties would actually be impacted by its
decision. The same commentator further commented on DeBoer as follows:
From the Schmidts [the biological parents] I heard a plea for vindication,
some compassionate understanding of how in distress Cara Schmidt could
relinquish her baby, a plea for recognition that the Schmidts would now
fight to rectify past mistakes and attempt redeem a scarred family. I heard
the Schmidts’ plea to Jessica to understand that—win or lose—her parents
had not abandoned and forgotten her, but were willing to expose
themselves to public calumny to prove their love for her. From the
DeBoer’s perspective I heard the sheer horror of losing a child they had
raised since birth, never to see her, hear her, or embrace her again, and
relinquishing their cherished daughter to people whose lives were shaped
by brutality and guilt. I heard the DeBoer’s despair, once having nurtured
Jessica’s unquestioning trust and security in them, now to breach that trust
and destroy that security, as though they, Jessica’s seemingly omniscient
parents, had willingly let her go.173
Observers, including the millions of Americans following this drama on
television,174 were all left to wonder how it was that under the best interests of the
child standard the actual impact of the decision on the girl’s well-being was nowhere
to be found in the court’s opinion?
While DeBoer was not an easy case, the Single Objective Analysis could have at
least zeroed in on the actual facts themselves and asked the most relevant questions.
Thus, the court could have factored into its analysis the following: (1) the immense
psychological harm inflicted on a small and uncomprehending child being torn from
her caring home (damage characterized by expert psychologists in DeBoer as
“devastating” and “permanent”);175 and (2) the harm to those adoptive parents that
had committed their lives to that daughter.176 These interests could then be weighed
against: (1) the benefit/pleasure that the birth parents would enjoy in stepping in to
raise that child; further considering that (2) those parents had had a genuine change
of heart; but (3) whom the child had never known; and (4) where the father allegedly
had previously abandoned two other children.177 At least acknowledging these
factors would guarantee more just opinions. Otherwise, outcomes are always reliant
on abstract legal rules that are blind to the facts and the parties themselves.
172

Id. at 79.

173

Id. at 76-77.

174

See, e.g., Bill Hewitt, Losing Jessi, PEOPLE, July 19, 1993, at 49-54; Nancy Gibbs, In
Whose Best Interest?, TIME, July 19, 1993, at 48-49.
175

Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 79.

176

Id. at 16-18.

177

See Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 400.
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Again, from here the law could then gradually establish more concrete guidelines
for such cases. As a few examples, our courts and psychologists can continue to
better quantify the levels of trauma involved in breaking up established and stable
adoptive families. At some of the earlier stages of childhood development there are
lesser levels of trauma caused by tearing a child away from a family. In these cases
a biological parent’s claim can be given greater weight. In later stages of a child’s
development, however, it may make little or no sense at all to upturn these lives, thus
the biological parent’s interest would decline accordingly.
Further, already being implemented are longer waiting periods before mothers
may relinquish their children for adoption, thus eliminating many hasty decisions
that later may be regretted. And when there are any objections to adoptions, there
can be expedited judicial review, which also reduces the time children spend bonding
with families they may ultimately be torn away from.178 Thus, under the framework
provided by the Single Objective Analysis, our courts could thus shift their approach
to such questions and a more logical and more humane analysis.
As further examples, and returning to Troxel again, applying the Single Objective
Analysis there would have allowed our courts to ask the following: (1) what
involvement the third party actually had in the children’s lives; (2) the effect the
decision would actually have on the parent; and (3) the effect the decision would
actually have on the children (and – perhaps, also to ask (4) what the mother’s reason
was for denying the visits).
The only questions that needed to be asked in DeShaney would have concerned
the state social agencies’ complete breakdown: Were those social workers undertrained, under-funded, under-qualified or understaffed? There were no other issues.
The only reasonable solution would be to hold the state liable, thereby giving it a
maximum incentive to identify exactly where it had failed so horribly; to bring a
child belated justice; and to provide an improved social system for all future
children.
And parents such as the Santoskys would finally be forced to either make positive
changes in their home, or otherwise be held accountable, while the well being of
those children could finally be acknowledged under the law.
XI. THE DEPENDENT NATURE OF CHILDREN AND AUTONOMY
One particular aspect of the Single Objective Analysis requires additional
discussion. The third of the Key Principles states that: “The Direct Effect of a
Decision on the Interests of Parents and Children are Examined Individually.” Thus,
within a framework of legitimate and well-defined parental rights, this analysis will
indeed acknowledge a minimal level of affirmative interests for children. Of course,
the potential problem in such an approach is the risk of jeopardizing parental
authority, altogether. The concern is that children not firmly under the “control” of
their parents will then fail to receive the critical moral direction and necessary
structure necessary in their lives, and thus become alienated and/or out of control.
Yet, the Single Objective Analysis indeed makes parental authority the
paramount interest in the home. The very foundation of this analysis is the single
goal of producing not only happy children, but also well-adjusted and disciplined
ones, as well. Therefore, under this analysis our courts could never simply give

178

See id. at 399.
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children free reign to do anything they wish. In fact, the Single Objective Analysis
does not even necessarily expand on the interests of children, but merely helps the
law more accurately define those interests.
A. Discipline and Autonomy
Before examining this third “Key Principal” in more detail, it will be helpful to
first address certain past mischaracterizations of the parent-child relationship that
have hindered this analysis. At times, the very notion of any affirmative “children’s
rights” or autonomy has been distorted to the point that even acknowledging the very
well being of children is attacked as being akin to the promotion of anarchy in the
home.179
One example is the comments of then-presidential candidate Pat Buchanan, and
others, at the 1992 Republican National Convention to the effect that an increased
recognition of children’s rights (specifically referring to a 1972 law review article
written by now-Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton), would ultimately lead to children
suing parents over mundane matters, such as taking out the garbage.180 While this
more general concern for sustaining parental autonomy is clear, the given
hypothetical was far removed not only from the law review article at issue, but also
from the actual state of the law, as well.
All politics aside, Senator Clinton’s ideas clearly were “only applicable to cases
of severely abused and neglected children,” such as Joshua DeShaney and the
Santosky children.181 Senator Clinton’s article then cannot in good conscience be
cited to support the above hypothetical.
A similar example was the high-profile 1994 case of Kingsley v. Kingsley.182 In
Kingsley, the national media had widely reported that a Florida child had actually
“divorced” his parents.183 The facts, however, told quite a different story. First, in
Kingsley it was the parents who had abandoned the child.184 Young Gregory K. had
been bouncing from foster family to foster family for years. The man who then

179

In fact, a strong aversion to the most rudimentary of affirmative rights for children has
long plagued the U.S. legal system. Illustrative is that the first case of legal child abuse in
America was not brought until 1874. Representing the abused little girl in that case was the
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. (ASPCA). The ASPCA
represented the child because while the laws of the day did protect animals against cruel and
unusual treatment, they did nothing for children. N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 1874, at 8.
180

Eleanor Clift & Pat Wingert, Hillary Clinton’s Not-So-Hidden Agenda, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 21, 1992, at 70.
181

See, e.g., id. (“Clinton’s theories clearly are only applicable to severely abused and
neglected children.”).
182

623 So.2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

183

See, e.g., Pat Wingert & Eloise Salhoz, Irreconcilable Differences, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
21, 1992; Mark Hansen, Boy Wins ‘Divorce’ From Mom: Critics Claim Ruling Will
Encourage Frivolous Suits By Dissatisfied Kids, 78 A.B.A. J. 16 (Dec. 1992); Jacqueline D.
Stanley, Concerns For Termination of Parental Rights, 32 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 83,
84 (1995) (“The inaccurate labeling of these cases as ‘divorces’ initiated by children against
their parents was probably responsible for much of their notoriety.”).
184

Kingsley, 623 So.2d at 787.
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finally attempted to adopt Gregory happened to have been a lawyer himself who then
“helped” Gregory in hiring his own attorney.185
While the actual legal process involved in Kingsley did raise some legitimate
concerns,186 it was also “less revolutionary than it sounds – while Gregory may be
the first child to hire his own lawyer, it is standard for foster parents to do so in the
child’s stead.”187 Thus, that Gregory had hired his “own” attorney in this case was
an anomaly.
More significantly – and as to the alarming characterization of a “divorcing” –
Gregory was not even granted standing in his case; nor was he allowed to file his
case on his own behalf; nor did his rights ever even rise to a level where he could
deny his mother his “obedience and service.”188 In short, Kingsley cannot remotely
be said to resemble a “divorce.”
Yet, while probably few people ever actually understood all of the circumstances
of Kingsley, many remember the attention grabbing headlines where it is was the
child/“divorcer” effectively portrayed as a sort of home-wrecker. The end-result in
Kingsley was simply that after years without a family, Gregory was finally placed in
a permanent home where he was very much wanted.
In any event, both of the above stated concerns are easily disposed of under the
Single Objective Analysis. First, no court would ever consider either creating for a
child any “rights” to be free from family chores in the home, nor to actually
“divorce” his parents. The Single Objective Analysis would never be triggered
under these circumstances.
Yet, the first hypothetical is, in fact, most helpful in demonstrating just how clear
and exceptional the protections for parental rights actually are under the Single
Objective Analysis. Assume that a child has decided that a parent’s order to take out
the garbage is not in his or her “best interests.” Unfortunately for that child,
however, all rational persons can agree that children need a certain measure of
discipline and responsibility in their lives (a time-tested principle) in order to fully
develop as happy, well-adjusted, and disciplined individuals (the Single Objective).
So long as the chore is reasonable (procedural and evidentiary safeguards protect
parents), as taking out the garbage surely is, there can be no argument that the order
(parental authority) is not ultimately in the child’s own (separate) best interests.
Whether the child should happen to appreciate his or her best interest at any
particular moment in time is irrelevant under this analysis. Instead, a child’s “right”
is simply a right to an opportunity to benefit from reasonable discipline and
structure, while a parent has the distinct right to be able instill the same.189 Thus, the

185

See Clift & Wingert, supra note 180, at 70.

186

On the one hand, the mother was incapable of caring for Gregory but for a few months
over an eight-year period; on the other hand, some argued that had the state provided the
mother financial assistance directly, instead of giving the assistance to a foster family, the
family perhaps could have stayed together. See Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 75.
187

Clift & Wingert, supra note 180, at 84(quoting family law expert Robert Mnookin).

188

Fitzgerald, supra note 9.

189

With an opportunity not being the same thing as an entitlement.
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individual interests of parent and child would not only coexist under the Single
Objective Analysis, but they would also actually complement one another, as well.190
B. Autonomy vs. Alienation
Of course, there are indeed very real challenges in recognizing even a minimal
level of affirmative interests for children. Again, the problem is how to ensure that
autonomy cannot be equated to anarchy or alienation. As one commentator has
observed:
The individual tradition is at the heart of American culture. Yet the
fulfillment of individualism’s promise of personal liberty depends,
paradoxically, upon the maintenance of a set of corollary traditions that
require what may seem to be the opposite of personal liberty: submission
to authority, acceptance of responsibility, and the discharge of duty. The
family tradition is among the most essential corollaries to the individual
tradition, because it is in families that both children and parents
experience the need for and the value of authority, responsibility, and duty
in their most pristine forms. When individualism breaks loose from its
corollaries, however, its tendency to destroy personal fulfillment and
human relationships is exposed . . . . Perhaps it is no coincidence that the
recent period of expansive egalitarianism is also the period of the most
widespread loneliness and alienation Western culture has known.191
The question presented by the above passage is that once limits are placed on the
conception of parental control since extrapolated from Meyer and Pierce, how then
can the state otherwise ensure that the family will not simply fall apart?
First, under the Single Objective Analysis, children would still enjoy the same
legitimate discipline and could be provided the same guidance and support as they
are currently allowed. The only difference here would be that more logical and
better-defined safeguards and parameters would be in place to deal with the more
difficult of issues.
Second, the autonomy described in the Single Objective Analysis is not anarchic,
but is merely an acknowledgement of the most minimal possible conception of
human rights.
Still, there are, of course, many situations where control and coercion are
absolutely necessary in raising and protecting children. Yet, what the Single
Objective Analysis challenges is not the notion of authority, but any notion of total
control one could ever truly have over a child. The current logic is that granting
parents total control of children will actually serve to eliminate any and all
ambiguities or potentially negative outcomes in the parent-child relationship. This

190

In fact, DeShaney perfectly illustrates how the Single Objective Analysis may provide
an optimal balance of the true individual interests of parent and child with the smallest risk for
legal error possible. Under this approach the goal of the parent is ultimately the same as that
of the child: for the child to be happy, well adjusted and disciplined, or, in Joshua’s case that
means trying to even save a child’s life. Thus, not only would state intervention have been in
Joshua’s best interests, but it would have also been in his parent’s best interests.
191

Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations
About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 656-657 (1976).
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approach, however – while it certainly sounds nice – is not grounded in reality.
Instead of an idealized family, such logic merely glosses over the very real and very
difficult issues presented in the real world. In many cases the current approach even
has little or no practical value, at all.192
For example, did the Santosky parents’ rights of custody and control really mean
that their children’s actual well being should be made irrelevant to the courts’
decision? And, in DeShaney, at what point was the state effectively deferring to the
doctrine of parental autonomy and leaving the family alone – and at what point did
the state simply allow Joshua to disappear?
In fact, the recognizing of the basic, healthy individual autonomy of family
members is an optimal state for all families. And this principal only becomes more
important in those families, such as Santosky or DeShaney, where serious legal
problems, as well as social, emotional, or psychological ones, have clearly been
identified. In fact, the principal of individual autonomy has been traditionally
accepted throughout history and around the world, as evidenced anywhere from the
doctrines of all of the world’s major religions to the current leading academic
literature,193 and from the historical practices of Native Americans194 to modern
twelve-step programs.195
For example, often the most vocal group to oppose any such affirmative interests
of children has been the Christian far right.196 Yet, perhaps no source has spoken
192

Further, children may still be severely harmed even if their bare societal minimums of
“care,” of food, clothing and shelter are met. See, e.g., Reno, 507 U.S. at 304 (requiring that
as long as parents meet “certain minimum requirements of childcare,” any interests of the child
may be subordinated to the doctrine of parental autonomy) (emphasis in original)); see also
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“But even a fit parent is capable of treating a
child like a mere possession.”).
193

See generally, ANDREW THOMPSON, GUIDE TO ETHICAL PRACTICE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 13
(1990); Judith C. Daniluk & Beth E. Haverkamp, Child Sexual Abuse: Ethical Issues For the
Family Therapist, 42 FAM. REL. 134, 134 (1993).
194

Upon reaching adolescence, the boys of the Pueblo and Hopi tribes were freed from
parental supervision for training in their respective tribal religions. Algonquin boys were
separated from their parents for a nine-month period, sometime between the ages of ten and
fifteen, for their introductions to tribal spirituality and religion. HARVEY MARKOWITZ,
AMERICAN INDIANS 634 (1995).
195
Modern “twelve-step” programs clearly make individual autonomy the foundation of
group success. For example, in Al-Anon (for family and friends effected by alcoholics), “The
family members must first learn to cope with their own problems before any beneficial effects
can reach the alcoholic.” A GUIDE FOR THE FAMILY OF THE ALCOHOLIC 8, AL-ANON FAMILY
GROUPS. For recovering alcoholics in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), “Let no alcoholic say he
cannot recover unless he has his family back . . . . his recovery is not dependent on [specific]
people.” ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 99 (Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., 3d ed.,
1993). And Co-Dependants Anonymous (for those seeking healthy relationships, romantic
and otherwise) also discusses the opposite of autonomy. “We hear enmeshment phrases every
day, such as, ‘You’re my everything’ . . . ‘I need you,’ or ‘You make me whole . . . .’
Enmeshment doesn’t allow for individuality, wholeness, personal empowerment, healthy
relationships with ourselves or with others.” CO-DEPENDENTS ANONYMOUS 106-107 (CoDependents Anonymous, 1995).
196
As one example, the failed House Bill: The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of
1995, made no mention of children’s rights. Much of the Bill’s language was apparently taken
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more strongly or more clearly toward the importance of individual autonomy within
the family than Jesus Himself:
Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send
peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his
father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law
against her mother in law. And a man’s foes shall be they of his own
household. He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of
me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me.
And he that taketh not his cross, and followeth after me, is not worthy of
me. He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my
sake shall find it.197
In other words, even the “honoring” of one’s mother and father has never been
meant to suggest that blindly endorsing unhealthy or destructive behavior is a path to
truth or happiness.198 This identical point is articulated in the Koran, as well: “We
have charged man that he be kind to his parents, but if they strive with thee to make
thee association with Me that whereof thou hast no knowledge, then do not obey
them; unto me you shall return, and I shall tell you what you are doing.”199
In short, sometimes the doctrine of parental autonomy simply marks the starting
point for any logical legal analysis of the family.
Healthy autonomy need not ever undermine a parent’s ability to instill rules in the
home or to discipline children. Autonomy merely means preventing parents from
violating or invalidating children. Conversely, autonomy prevents children from
disrespecting legitimate parental rights and authority, from harming themselves, or
from harming the interests of the family as a whole.200 Thus, healthy autonomy
always allows for legitimate discipline, structure, and guidance in the home.

from a book put out by the Christian Coalition. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in
the Private Family: The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politi8cs of Child
Protection and Education, 57 OHIO ST .L.J. 393, 398 (1996).
197

Matthew, 10:34-38 (emphasis added).

198

And this sense of individual autonomy is central to the teachings of the Buddha, as well:
“Therefore, Ananda, be ye lamps unto yourselves, be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake
yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as a lamp; hold fast to the truth as a
refuge. Look not for a refuge in any one beside yourselves.” JACK KORNFIELD, TEACHINGS OF
THE BUDDHA IN SACRED BOOK OF THE BUDDHISTS (1993).
199

Koran, Book II, 97:8.

200

For a detailed description as to how toxic bonds and a lack of autonomy among even
moderately dysfunctional families can perpetuate the problems of individuals see Michael A.
Kerr, In Chronic Anxiety and Defining A Self, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1988. “Each
person’s mode of functioning reinforces the others. The overfunctioning parents, who are
usually perceived as ‘normal,’ and the underfunctioning patient, who is perceived as ‘sick,’
actually perpetuate, unwittingly for the most part, each others behavior.” Id. Dr. Kerr’s
analysis could be summarized in one word: Enmeshment. “Not only was it difficult therefore,
to think of mother and patient as separate people, but it was difficult to think of any family
members that way.” See also Michael A. Kerr, Darwin to Freud to Bowen, GEORGETOWN,
Spring, 1988. Until such toxic bonds are broken, no one in a family is likely to get better.
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C. Autonomy and Accountability
The unavoidable truth is that it is only through recognizing some minimum level
of individual autonomy that there can ever be individual accountability. Under the
Single Objective Analysis, blame and excuses for problems in the home are best
eliminated – and replaced with an increase in personal responsibility.
For example, even a child coming from a horrible home environment need not
ever be excused from adhering to any basic societal and familial norms, such as
regular attendance at school or in refraining from the use of drugs or alcohol. The
bottom line is that holding children responsible for their actions fosters individual
responsibility and growth and, therefore, is crucial to their being happy, well
adjusted, and disciplined.
In ignoring any notion of autonomy, the current analysis actually ignores the core
problems that often make these cases so difficult in the first place. For example,
many families are in court specifically because those above mentioned family
dynamics of “authority,” “responsibility,” and “duty,” have never existed in the
home, or at least not in any healthy sense. For example, and unfortunately, in too
many homes “authority” has meant dehumanization; “responsibility” has meant
blame; and any sense of “duty” may have been nonexistent. Anytime these are the
dynamics that exist within a family, blindly deferring to an overly broad and overly
rigid conception of parental autonomy will only exacerbate problems.
Therefore, the state must have an ability to assert itself into the affairs of that
family under certain circumstances. Or, the state must at least be able to offer family
members access to social, emotional or psychological help outside of that family
structure. To otherwise demand change without offering adequate help or solutions
outside that family system will only foster frustration, blame, and a lack of individual
accountability. Thus, problems are guaranteed to get worse.
D. Autonomy and Effectiveness
The beauty of healthy individual autonomy is that once the most just legal
framework and assistance is in place, and individuals still choose not to take positive
action in their lives, then there is nobody for that individual to blame.201 At this
point the law finally may act, or not act, with a maximum of effectiveness and
legitimacy.
For example, children are utterly dependent on having protectors and healthy role
models in their lives. Without such help, children will have an extraordinary, uphill
battle in simply learning how to live in society in a healthy manner. It is better
established now than ever that children from dysfunctional homes are far more likely
to abuse alcohol or drugs; to have worse physical health; to be depressed; to engage
201
Acknowledgment of freewill is also the key to Rawls’ A THEORY OF JUSTICE. Rawls’
ideal society comes “as close as a society to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the
principles which free and equal persons would assert to under circumstances that are fair. In
this sense its members are autonomous and the obligations they recognize are self-imposed.”
RAWLS, supra note 134. And in the words of Albert Schweitzer, “Example is not the main
thing in influencing others. It is the only thing.” ALBERT SCHWEITZER, THE WORLD OF ALBERT
SCHWEITZER (1995); see also JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER ON TOLERATION, POLITICAL WRITINGS
OF JOHN LOCKE (David Wooten ed.) (1983) (“It is only light and evidence that can work a
change in men’s opinions, and that light can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings or
any other outward penalties.”).
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in self-destructive behavior, including suicide;202 to engage in criminal behavior;203
and to eventually pass emotionally dysfunctional behaviors on to their own
children.204 Therefore, to hold a troubled child accountable and expect that child to
change his or her behavior without some type of assistance or support from outside
what may be a horribly troubled home is analogous to sending someone to France to
learn to speak Spanish. And, for example, if in a particular case a parent is known to
have serious emotional or behavioral problems, he or she must have some sort of
access to counseling or similar help if he or she can really then be held accountable
for improving his or her family life.205
Thus, if the basic, and historically established concept of individual autonomy is
not acknowledged in our legal system, the law will not only lack any sense of
legitimacy, but it is also doomed to be highly ineffective, as well.
XII. SOCIETIES’ MOST DESERVING, MOST DEFENSELESS,
AND MOST FORGOTTEN CITIZENS
Finally, while the Single Objective Analysis could improve the analysis of any
case involving the parent-child relationship, the most logical starting point to instill
202

Two recent studies link adverse childhood factors (e.g., psychological, physical or
sexual abuse, member in family incarcerated, abused or a substance abuser) with cancer, heart
disease, having fifty or more sex partners, severe obesity, etc. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
MEDICINE, October 1999; Anda, R.F., Edwards, V., et al., Relationship of childhood abuse and
household dysfunction to many of the leading causes of death in adults, 14 AM.J. OF
PREVENTIVE MED. 245-258, May 1998.
203

PEGGY SMITH, ET AL., California State University of Long Beach, Synopsis, LONG-TERM
CORRELATES OF CHILDHOOD VICTIMIZATION: CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION & NONINTERVENTION 4 (1982) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (finding that abuse
victims are more likely to have arrest records and adult convictions than comparison subjects);
RAYMOND H. STARR, JR., ET AL., LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENTAL OUTCOMES OF CHILD
MALTREATMENT, IN EFFECTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 11-12, 14-16 (Raymond H. Starr
& David A. Wolfe eds., 1991).
204
RUTH S. KEMPE & C. HENRY KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE, 12-14 (Jerome Bruner, Michael
Cole & Barbara Lloyd eds., 1978) (“The most consistent feature of the histories of abusive
families is the repetition from one generation to the next of a pattern of abuse, neglect and
parental loss or deprivation.”). Also, 38% of perpetrators of abuse in one study were found to
have been sexually abused as children. JEAN RENVOIZ, INNOCENCE DESTROYED: A STUDY OF
SEXUAL ABUSE 107 (1993). An illustrative example of this vicious cycle is the dynamic of
sexually abused young girls being more likely to become mothers on welfare. Jason DeParle,
Early Sex Abuse Hinders Many Women on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Nov 8, 1999, at A-1. While
the issue has never been adequately examined, its prevalence in so-called “hard cases” seems
unmistakable. Often the pattern is sexually abused girls being more likely to be teen mothers,
who are more likely to be drop-outs, who are ultimately more likely to be on welfare. Id.
205
See, e.g., Children Left Behind, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 19, 2004, A.28
(“Congress had no trouble finding ‘savings’ to supposedly offset new costs when the costs
were in a corporate tax bill stuffed with special-interest provisions,” yet, “when it comes to
health care for poor children, different, stricter rules seem to apply.”); Clea Benson, Rallying
to Save Rehab Programs, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, March 28, 2003, B5 (quoting Philadelphia
Police Commissioner with regards to budget cuts for drug treatment centers, “All I know is
that treatment works . . . . If you have a war against drugs, how can you fight it if you don’t
give us the ammunition?”).
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change is to begin to protect the interests of our least politicized, yet most helpless of
individuals: children. Today the U.S. is plagued by an embarrassing lack of legal
representation for children, a long ignored and disintegrating foster-care system, and
understaffed, under-funded, and often under-trained, social workers and agencies.
Our societal failures in this area is evidenced both in some high-profile stories,
such as of starvation or even dungeon-like abuse of children supposedly under state
“supervision,” in homicidal parents never held accountable for their actions,206 or in
broader, system-wide failures on a rather staggering level. A recent report by the
Child and Family Service Reviews, for example, found that, “Not a single state has
passed a rigorous test of its ability to protect children from child abuse and to find
permanent homes for kids who often languish in foster care.”207 Thus, it is long
overdue to ask precisely what “family values” really means to this nation.208
Due to the inherently vulnerable and utterly dependent nature of children, our
current approach is immoral, illogical, unconstitutional, and, in fact, directly negates
the Bill of Rights itself. Until society decides to adequately acknowledge its most
desperate and most helpless members, dysfunctional family values will continue to
be perpetuated in future generations.
XIII. CONCLUSION
While nowhere is it stated that the process of establishing healthy individual
boundaries within the family is easy or painless,209 doing so will best ensure the
206

In a series of articles, CHICAGO TRIBUNE columnist Bob Greene told the story of a child
brutally beaten to death by his parents. At no time was anyone allowed to speak on behalf of
the child (such as the treating medical professionals, for example). Ultimately the parents
were released after three years of prison (due to a legal mechanism unique to that court) by a
judge who attributed the torturous death not to malice, but simply to “bad parenting.” Bob
Greene, Words That the Judge Would Not Allow to be Spoken, available at http://chicago
tribune.com/news/columnists/chic00107greenepj.column (visited Feb. 19, 2002)(on file with
author).
207

States Failing New Test of Child Welfare System, available
http://new.wset.com/news/stories/0803/99105.html (visited February 12, 2005)

at

208

Often the political will of this country is to avoid the “enabling” of poorer parents with
public assistance and to avoid using tax dollars to cure the problem of what maybe seen as
ineffective parents. The idea is to empower those individuals either to lift themselves out of
poverty and/or to remove any disincentive for those parents in becoming more accountable for
their situations.
First, however, and no matter to what degree one might accept this approach; such a policy
can ever be transferred to children. Such an effort tells these already violated children that,
while they already have little reason to trust anyone, society does in fact value their lives and
will in fact attempt to put them into the real world with some life skills and at least a little
hope.
Finally, the monetary cost to society for providing for the social needs and counseling of
parents, as well as the legitimate social service protections of children and the foster care
system, may be the best long-term economic investment this country ever makes. It is very
likely that for many of these parents, such as the Santoskys, for example, have emotional and
psychological problems that run far deeper than any presumed financial disincentive that may
arise from the state saving their children for them.
209
“There is but one neurosis, many manifestations and one cure—feeling….Feeling pain
is the end of suffering.” Dr. Arthur Janov’s Primal Center (quoting DR. ARTHUR JANOV, WHY
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interests of every individual. Yet, the Single Objective Analysis still cannot
guarantee that children never become alienated or out-of-control. Instead, this
analysis can provide the American family with the strongest and healthiest structure
and support possible, which is the most that the law could ever hope to do. All that
is really left for society and parents to do then is to take a mandatory leap of faith—
and to believe in children.

YOU GET SICK—HOW YOU GET WELL (1996)) available at http://www.primaltheraphy.com/
(last visited February 15, 2005).
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